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ABSTRACT 
 Talbot Brewer’s Retrieval of Ethics and Robert Adams’s Finite and Infinite Goods 
present distinct theories in ethics and metaethics.  Brewer begins with the fundamental ethical 
perspective of the practical deliberator who experiences his practical deliberations as a 
continuous, unified, and constantly revised activity which begins with inchoate intimations of 
goodness and proceeds better or worse to understand and pursue the goodness which pervades 
his evaluative outlook. From this Brewer aims to account for how we achieve excellence in 
practical deliberation and arrive at a more tenable and self-consistent evaluative outlook which 
informs our ethical deliberations.  Alternately, Adams begins in the linguistic community and the 
role suggested by our ordinary language which ‘good’.  From this a deeply metaphysical account 
is developed of ordinary goods as, in a sense, parasitic on a transcendent and infinite good to 
which their intelligibility is owed and upon which traditional moral notions of obligation and the 
like are appealingly based. 
 This thesis argues that each theory, though similar, has distinct strengths and weaknesses 
which might complement each other in a synthetic theory strengthened by both.  Adams’s 
transcendent Good, while it secures objectivity and maximal sharedness, lacks a criterion for 
higher and lower order goods.  Brewer’s epistemology couched in practical reason, while 
establishing an intriguing picture of the good human life, lacks a firm grounding outside the 
individual to avoid subjectivism.  My solution is to push the two theories together with a 
dialectical criterion for Adams and a notion of the transcendent community for Brewer. 
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CHAPTER I 
PROBLEMS IN ROBERT ADAMS’S FINITE AND INFINITE GOODS 
I. Introduction 
 Finite and Infinite Goods is equal parts metaphysical and ethical.  The metaphysics grows 
from the semantics of goodness to a Platonist/theist theory of transcendent Goodness in God and 
its explanatory power in ethical thought.  The ethics takes the good as primary, but focuses on 
excellence, understood as Godlikeness, as the ethical concept it sees as essential to a system of 
ethics.  Well-being and human values are constituted by excellence, love for excellence is the 
best explanation of the ethical ordering of value, and the excellence of social relations grounds 
morality.  The transcendent excellence of God is fully immersed in Finite’s ethical framework; 
metaphysics and ethics are never far apart.      
 The theory could be said to front-load its ethical content into a maximally thick standard 
of goodness and then unpack its content’s place in relevant ethical positions.  To put the point 
structurally, it appears to be a top-down, as opposed to a bottom-up, sort of ethics:  the character 
of the qualitatively highest and quantitatively lowest goods determines the place of the lower 
goods.  The problem with putting it this way is that the place of transcendence expands the 
standard of the qualitatively highest goods such that ‘excellent’ and ‘good’ are nearly 
contiguous.  In this chapter, I first argue that Finite has expanded the ordinary notion of 
excellence by his semantic metaphysics and the application of a transcendent perspective as a 
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criterion of what is worthy of love.  I then demonstrate that this expansion of excellence 
produces unsatisfactory results in Adams’s ethical theory.  I conclude that Finite is deficient in 
an account of the rough, but intuitive, distinction between higher and lower excellences and offer 
a sketch of what features the needed account would possess.  
 II. Summary 
 This section gives a summary of Finite’s foundational metaphysics of value and the 
ethical framework built on top of it.  Adams’s epistemology and political considerations are not 
included here, because they would add further baggage to an already strained effort and are 
largely subsidiary and unessential to the ethical theory.     
II.1 Metaphysics: supernaturalistic realism and the transcendent Good 
Adams begins Finite by proposing “a framework for ethics that is organized around a 
transcendent Good and its relation to the many finite goods of our experience.”1 The finite goods 
are those we experience as, broadly defined, excellent.  The transcendent Good is the infinitely 
good God.  The transcendent Good is introduced as a best fit for the nature of ‘good’ suggested 
by the role such a nature must play in semantic use.  Finite’s metaphysics is an effort to co-opt 
semantic role naturalistic metaphysics by replacement of naturalism with supernaturalism.  
Adams puts his semantic argument: “What is given by the meaning… of the words, is a role that 
the nature is to play.  If there is a single candidate that best fills the role, that will be the nature of 
the thing.”2  To avoid anti-realist or emotivist conclusions, Adams curtails his study to good 
meant as excellent.  Realism about the transcendent Good arrives at the semantic level “insofar 
                                                          
1
 Adams (1999), p3 
2
 Ibid., p16 
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as our actual way of discoursing about the good seems plausible.”3  This semantically founded 
realism is built from the linguistic treatment of statements involving ‘good’ as applicable to rules 
of logic and assertions of fact. 
Experiences of finite goods (good and excellent will hereon be interchangeable when 
referring to their place Finite) are fragmentary glimpses of the transcendent Good and their 
excellence is best understood as imaging various transcendently excellent features of this infinite 
Good.  The one thing which adequately fills the role suggested by the diverse array of ‘good’ 
predications (whether of airplanes, mountains, or relationships) is a transcendent Good which 
exemplifies and shares all of the excellent features we pick out among them.  The excellence of a 
particular thing fits the fragmentary phenomenon of our experiences of goods and their 
seemingly massive disparity of qualities by fragmentarily imaging features of the transcendent 
Good.  Various goods are suitably related without reduction to any apparently shared property, 
because godlikeness is a metaphysical abstraction from the instances of excellence.  In this way, 
Adams’s transcendence thesis fits usage’s surface suggestion of unity by offering an ordering 
relation among all genuine goods. 
Transcendence is supported by an epistemology of value which places empirical testing 
and scientific reasoning within the broader “web of commonsense belief and judgment in which 
science is embedded and on which [they] inescapably depend.”4  Evaluative belief formation and 
an adequate agreement between evaluators in the linguistic community on central cases are 
inescapable aspects of truth.  Adams takes this farther by insisting that a critical stance on ethical 
beliefs is essential to any mature ethical understanding.  The naturalistic realist cannot account 
                                                          
3
 Ibid., p18 
4
 Ibid., p73 
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for this ethical feature because it is forsworn by any imagined identification of value with a 
property cluster.5  Adams asserts that a supernaturalistic realist account of good which can 
accommodate our epistemic shortcomings and the importance of the critical stance will be a 
theory of transcendence.  
II.2 Ethics: excellence and love for the good 
Application of the transcendence thesis shapes an ethical theory which takes excellence 
and love as its foundational concepts.  On Adams’s view, a person’s well-being is a life 
characterized by enjoyment of the excellent.  He arrives at this view from the perspective of a 
loved-one, specifically the common-sense perspective of what a parent should judge good for 
their child; the kind of life for their child which would satisfy their love.6  Adams takes it that 
good parents want their children to live enjoyable, excellent lives.  Neither enjoyment nor 
excellence alone will suffice.  Since what is good for a person is a life filled with appreciation of 
excellences and these excellences connect to facets of the divine nature, a person’s well-being is 
constituted by a life closely tied to transcendence. 
The value of persons as persons is secured by their being ontologically sacred.  That is, 
people and their rights must be treated as sacred because of what they are.  The sacred is 
explained as an ontological category by dint of the strength of its transcendent resemblance 
relation.  The strongest indicator of this sacredness, outside of love, is our sense of moral horror 
in the violation of the sacred.  This sense of horror expands the scope of the sacred to, e.g., non-
human works of art and environments and requires their incorporation to ethical thinking.  What 
                                                          
5
 Ibid., p81 
6
 Ibid., p97 
5 
 
is truly sacred and violative is only vaguely articulable, but the scope is defined by this sense of 
moral horror.   
Adams’s ethical framework takes on a more substantive dress in his arguments that it is 
good to love the good. Love plays double duty in Finite both as an essential half of its 
motivational ideal and in the conceptual delimitation of excellence’s purview.  Since God’s love 
is the standard of love, what God finds worthy of love is the standard of excellence.  Love is both 
particular and universal and defies self-interest/altruistic bifurcation, though it is always self-
regarding in its relational content.  The ideal love possesses both Eros, which depends on the 
desire for an intrinsically valued relation to an excellent thing, and grace, which is unconstrained 
in its proportion to excellence.  Individuals (human and non-human) are loved for their 
excellence, a universal property, but are loved in themselves and not for the sake of this 
excellence.   God’s love is maximally universal and particular in loving all particulars of value in 
creation.  Not only persons, but also human artifacts like art and relationships, impersonal 
objects like animals and plants, and universals like truth and beauty are fit objects of love and are 
thus excellent in a fragmentary way. 
This is the keystone of love and the definition of excellence, though by human limitations 
we can only love or find excellent a very limited range of things, which generates the problem of 
personal ordering.  The wide range of values subsumed under excellence allows the 
defragmentation of value by an ideal of love for excellence as such.  This is important to avoid 
the value-fragmenter’s dilemma between the bland domination of aesthetic or intellectual value 
by moral or political value and the absurdity of irresolvable intrapersonal conflicts between types 
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of value.7  The solution is found in the ideal of a person possessing a general disposition to value 
good things; it disposes her to recognize goods generally and generates attitudes of loving, 
liking, or respecting all of those goods of which she is aware because of this recognition.8   A 
person’s values become integrated by the highest-order motivational ideal, explicitly or 
implicitly accepted, of being for, or loving, the good as such.9  Because of our human limitations 
and inescapable helplessness in fortune’s wake, the symbolic value (as opposed to consequential 
value) of our actions and attitudes is essential to this ideal’s expression.10 
II.3 Morality: obligations as social requirements and relations with the transcendent Good  
Moral value is secured a place in this ordering by its necessarily strong weight, 
negatively grounded in the concept of idolatry, in the motivational ideal of being for the good.  
Any love for a finite good which is not compatible with moral obligations is idolatrous because it 
is competing with this ideal and is integration by a non-transcendent good.11  It is combated by 
the critical stance (which previously secured transcendence against naturalistic reduction) in its 
filtering and questioning of commitments and values motivated by the humble recognition that 
one’s idea of the good falls infinitely short of actually understanding transcendence.   
Moral obligations are grounded in the value of a social relation with something that has 
value and can only be understood in a social context.12  The importance of obligations, their 
‘oughtness’, takes off from a Millian theory of duty indicated by deserts of social or legal 
                                                          
7
 Ibid., p22,181,182 
8
 Ibid., p188,189 
9
 Ibid., p191 
10
 Ibid., p224 
11
 Ibid., p205 
12
 Ibid., p232 
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punishment for actions or inactions.13  Obligations are negatively indicated externally by 
blaming and alienation and internally by feelings of guilt, not shame.  Obligatory actions arise 
from reasons of social requirement in actual, articulated demands and are expressions of the 
value of the social relations which generate them.14   
 Obligations of personal demands often conflict and arise from imperfectly good relations.  
To solve this issue, Adams posits a divine command theory idealization of social requirement 
which “covers the whole territory of moral obligations”.15  Divine commands issue from the 
transcendent Good which underpins all goodness in the context of a maximally excellent loving 
relationship between God and individuals. The values of the demander, the demands, and the 
relationship which generates the demands are maximally excellent, objective, just, and fair.  
These features, coupled with epistemic access for those who are obliged, support a divine 
command over divine will formulation, because it leaves room for supererogation16 and because 
God will not command acts which fall outside his nature. Abraham’s dilemma and any problem 
of autonomy are both bypassed because the interpretation of divine commands must be filtered 
through the critical stance.17  Thus, God’s nature must be incorporated into any understanding of 
the commands. 
III. The Breadth and Depth of Excellence and Love 
 The arguments of this chapter depend, as criticisms always do, on their target’s aptness to 
criticism.  In this section I focus on the character of excellence and love as they are developed in 
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 Ibid., p233, Reference is to Mill, Utilitarianism, ch. 5, para. 14 
14
 Ibid., p244 
15
 Ibid., p248 
16
 Ibid., p260 
17
 Ibid., p273, 290 
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Finite.  When the roles of these concepts and their relations are drawn out, a picture of 
excellence and love appears which is exceptionally stretched.  
III.1 Excellence as highest good, love as highest appreciation 
 When ‘excellent’ is predicated of a thing, the intuitive meaning of the assertion is that the 
thing is more than good— it is among highest of goods of its kind.  If someone tells me a movie 
is excellent and I trust their judgment, I expect the movie to be exceptionally good.  Excellent 
scissors are sharp, comfortable, smooth and durable; merely good scissors might only be sharp 
and durable. This is the meaning of good-as-excellence we bring to the table of Finite, because it 
is the meaning by which we reason and express.  Likewise, we mean in saying we love 
something, if we are not being hyperbolic, that we have our highest appreciation of the thing.  
We like and respect many things, but we love comparatively few things.  Intuitively, we only 
truly love those things which possess a certain degree of excellence that makes them stand out.  
At a general level, there are of course many types of loves and excellences, different in degree 
and importance. 
 These are the acme of goods and attitudes with which Adams appears to builds his ethics. 
They seem to share, at least linguistically, some common trait that Adams seeks to explain in 
theistically Platonic fashion by relating them to an exemplar in the ‘Form of excellence’ which is 
also a lover. Finite’s framework appears to be guided by the superlative sense of excellence 
sketched above; many of the examples are very high goods indeed.  Adams, with Plato, takes 
beauty to be the paradigmatic example of such excellence.  It is indicated by its ability to 
sometimes overwhelm our understanding and emotions, taken as the phenomenological indicator 
of transcendence.  It is that which is worthy of “love or admiration, honor or worship” whose 
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goodness is exemplified in “a sunset, painting, mathematical proof, or the greatness of a 
novel”.18     
 The place of love seems to share this superlative status by the high standards Finite 
imposes. Love for a good begins by inspiring admiration, but comes to be a desire for relation, 
often valued for its own sake, to the good which inspires it.  Love can be reciprocal or one-sided 
and can generate in any number of reasons, but is always beyond complete articulation.  Love is 
indicated by both valuing its object as excellent and outstripping this valuing, and negatively by 
never valuing its object primarily for the sake of another love.  Love in the ideal meets Buber’s 
“I-Thou” relationship, “It fills the firmament—not as if there were nothing else, but everything 
else lives in its light.”19 The central case of love is for persons, who must be loved as excellent, 
yet cannot be loved comparatively for, or only for the sake, their excellence.  The interpersonal 
ideal is Hesed, which is “extravagantly firm and open-ended, grounded in a non-comparative, 
unmeasured, but not necessarily uncritical valuing of the person.”20 
III.2 A transcendent ideal and the burden of egalitarianism 
 In light of what has been said so far, one would be inclined to think that Adams uses the 
ordinary, superlative usage of excellence to create an ethical framework which is as finitely, as 
infinitely, ‘top-down’.  On first impression, Finite sketches a metaphysical exemplar and then 
holds this transcendently exemplary excellence and love as the theoretical standard to a practical 
ethical standard which is correspondingly high.  This is not where Finite arrives.  At their 
extremes, the practical standards of excellence and love are stretched to maximal breadth and 
minimal depth.  Among the more distant in this range of appropriate objects of love and 
                                                          
18
 Ibid., p83 
19
 Ibid., p169, Ref. Buber, I and Thou, p126 
20
 Ibid., p172 
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excellence are: “particular animals, plants, and other natural objects; species and other natural 
kinds”, light passing through leaves, bad art, cars, meals, breath, and biological diversity.21   
 The causes of Finite’s expansionary policy, as I see it, are two: (1) the burden of 
egalitarianism and (2) standards sculpted by an ideal of transcendence, itself derived from a 
semantic gloss.  The first is relatively minor and will receive a quick treatment, while the second 
is the more important and will consume the rest of the section.  Finite’s expansion of excellence 
can be seen in part as an effort to dilute excellence of its illiberal connotations.  Adams notes that 
ethics of intrinsic excellence were, until recently, viewed with suspicion.22  These suspicions are 
cited as founded in egalitarian concerns conjured by the prima facie exclusivity of excellence.  
Adams shares these egalitarian pre-theoretical commitments and at several points in Finite, is 
careful to qualify and expand the meaning of excellence to accommodate them.  This is his 
explicit concern in the value of persons as persons, in allowing the excellence of bad art to avoid 
snobbery, and in denying that economic inequality and excellence are tied together.23  These 
points of contact are not structurally essential, but they do offer a glimpse into Adams’s larger 
motivations.  
 The real cause of the expansion of excellence is found in Adams’s employment of 
transcendence as an ethical ideal.  The process begins in its gloss of the gargantuan disparities 
between the senses of love and excellence as they are said or felt of different things.  Loves for 
frogs and pine trees are not really the same kinds of love as loves for spouses or life projects.  
When I say a scissors is excellent, I do not really mean the same sort of excellence said of my 
best friend.  By assuming a single metaphysical role from the surface structure of such distinct 
                                                          
21
 Ibid., p147, 194, 101, 187, 30, 116, 348 
22
 Ibid., p4 
23
 Ibid., p117,101,324 
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linguistic usage, whatever similarities exist between these things eclipses their differences.  
Seemingly, the only sense of similarity between an excellent muffin and an excellent husband is 
that they are higher goods of their kind, but this sense is just the kind thrown out by Adams’s 
metaphysical extrapolation.   
 It can be granted that the problems with gloss are not insoluble and that Adams’s 
argument moves forward successfully from semantic use to metaphysical nature to his 
transcendence thesis.  After all, the transcendent Good’s love and excellence are assembled from 
those exemplary excellences mentioned in III.2.  The extension of excellence could not really 
come at that stage, because, regardless of glossing, Adams’s works with existent practical ideals 
to a metaphysical ideal which transcends any understanding.  It makes sense that from a God’s 
eye view, the value of birds and persons is not as different as we imagine.  God might also 
rightly be said to have a sort of relational love with all of his creation, too.  A lizard’s 
consciousness is intelligible to God, though it is unintelligible to us.  As a metaphysical thesis 
taken from the ability of persons to value and dearly appreciate nearly anything, transcendence 
does not seem to be stretching at all.  
 So it is not, per se, the metaphysical thesis which is the cause.  Rather, it is the move 
from the transcendent ideal back to ethical theory which generates the extension of excellence.  
Specifically, it is the transcendent love applied as a criterion of love and value which is the 
cause.  The transcendent Good is “importantly like a person” in that it loves, judges, and 
commands.  Because it is unlimited in its abilities and goodness, its love has a universality that 
recognizes a certain degree of value in every non-bad portion of its creation.  Because this 
appreciative view of value is the definitive criterion for all loves and all finite excellences are 
equally infinitely far from the transcendent Good, the concepts of love and excellence are opened 
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up to maximal scope.  The sense of these concepts began in their higher form: love in the closest 
interpersonal relationships; excellence in the profundity of a favorite novel.  They ended in a 
form quite distant from these, in which species and amoeba are worthy of love.  Almost 
everything is excellent, but what does excellence now mean?  The necessary comparison class of 
the unexcellent has dwindled significantly. 
IV. The Problem with Expansion 
  The stretching of excellence and love described above creates some problems for Finite, 
because the superlative status of excellence and love are important practically and to his own 
theory’s development.  In this section, I highlight some of the inarticulacies and contradictions in 
Finite as it stands.  
IV.1 Practical vacuity          
 One of the problems I can now bring to light is that excellence and love have lost their 
practical efficacy.  Internal to Finite’s theory, when someone tells me a film is excellent, I will 
have no idea how to respond.  Since both good and bad films are now excellent and contribute to 
my wellbeing if I enjoy them, my ability to navigate the world, aside from developing a  firm 
disposition to enjoy everything,  seems now to be imperiled.  Of course, we do not reason this 
way and Adams can always fall back on taking our commonsense ethical judgments as they 
stand.  Yet Adams also asserts, contra Parfit, that any theory of morality must meet a publicity 
condition.24  I think it would be tenuous to hold publicity essential of moral but not ethical 
judgments.  Pace Finite’s view on moral judgments, part of what it means to say an act or artifact 
falls short of excellence is to say that it should be publicly discouraged from being regarded as 
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 Ibid., p237, Ref. to Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p43 
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such.  Given that part of publicity is livability among persons, Adams is on the hook for his 
theory’s unlivability.  
 This is a strong statement, but I think it is usually what people mean when they complain 
about shallow social tendencies or cultural artifacts.  When I say that a popular novel is droll, I 
am at least committed to other people not regarding the novel as beautiful.  Sometimes I will 
hedge my opinion, of course, because I can recognize that my opinion is not entirely developed 
or that, for whatever reason, I do not care for novels of that type.  Yet, and this is taken as part of 
the semantic foundation of Adams’s metaphysics, most such judgments are treated as fact 
stating.  The difference between the hedged opinion and the firm assertion depends on this 
distinction.  One side of practical vacuity, then, is that the ontology of these judgments’ truth-
makers has exploded. 
 Another issue with expanding excellence is that expressions and judgments of excellence 
and love are inherently comparative.  Imagine a world in which excellent art is effortless and 
people do not know how to make bad art.  All art in this world would, in a sense, be excellent.  
For navigation of such a world, the least good would be considered bad and the most good 
considered excellent.  Everyone’s a Wordsworth, but Wordsworth is tripe.  In this world, no 
matter what cultural artifact I choose to love, I cannot go far wrong.   In another world, truly 
excellent art is impossible and people cannot produce good art.  Mozart can only make muzak.  
In this world, no matter what cultural artifact I choose to love, I cannot go far right.  The problem 
is that we could never know what world we are in, because our judgments of what is worthy of 
love are inherently comparative.  Adams is not wrong that all art has a sort of excellence, but his 
theory’s generality eclipses the narrow meaning with the broad.  In this way, I think his 
14 
 
semantically-based metaphysics is offending against the practical role expressions of excellence 
play.  
IV.2 Problems in ethical and moral theory        
 The same problem in more concrete form arises in Adams’s attempt to prevent the 
incorporation of base biological drives, like rest, food, sensory stimulation, and sex, into a 
motivational ideal.  Because he has already committed himself to the excellence of our 
vegetative and animalistic natures, a motivational ideal of love for the good expressed in the 
satisfaction of these primitive drives is a sticking point.25  The excellence of the gluttonous sloth 
demonstrates the issue of excellence and love’s thinness.  A life organized around an ideal of 
loved eating, sleeping and masturbating while fulfilling all relevant obligations does not seem 
like a very ethical ordering.  As a consequence of excellence’s thinness, Adams is reduced to 
question begging. The first answer he offers is that they do not express interest in the 
comparative excellences of their satisfaction.  Unfortunately this makes them no less excellent 
and anyway the same could be said of almost any excellence.  I desire to read literature, but 
there’s no alternative means to its satisfaction besides reading literature.  I can read different 
types, but then I can sleep on my back or stomach or on a couch or hammock.  The second, 
longer answer is that they are the same across those who do and do not love the good.  But this is 
just what is under discussion: what love for the good entails.  Adams cannot appeal to the 
standard he is in the middle of establishing to delimit that same standard.  Worse still, he later 
says that honoring these natural aspects can be an important expression of love for the good. 
 Adams’s ethical scheme, especially idolatry, may be thought to prevent such parody.  I 
do not think that it does.  In the first place, Adams’s concern mentioned above is to prevent such 
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 Ibid., p192, He here reaffirms the commitment made in his treatment of wellbeing. 
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base natural drives from having ethical weight at all.  That goal is unaccomplished, but I am 
more concerned to press the larger defect in the ordering of ethical value.  Finite’s theory of 
agent-based ethics only has real two conditions.  One is to form a general disposition to care 
about goods and integrate your values by a motivational ideal of caring about goods.  The 
disposition can be implicit, taken from your valuing particular goods and at least respecting and 
liking all goods.  The motivational ideal must be “more or less explicit”; you must hold that the 
ideal which sculpts your disposition is to care about good, and not bad, things.  The other is to 
avoid idolatry of any finite good which prevents a person from being ‘in principle’ for the good 
generally.  Idolatry is indicated by an attachment or misidentification to a finite good which 
eclipses your view of goods, in particular as it hinders meeting your obligations.  Moreover, 
caring about any finite good to the exclusion of others, whether you do your duties or not, leaves 
you falling short of the “universal character of true love for the good”.26 
 These conditions, coupled with excellence’s thinness, either let in the excellent 
gluttonous sloth or they require more of persons than is psychologically feasible— there are 
weak or strong forms of the conditions.  Neither condition in weak form accomplishes much 
work on the first horn, because the excellent glutton could explicitly endorse his life as motivated 
by goodness and firmly hold that artistic and relational excellences are great, but not be moved 
one whit to care about them any more than that.  This agent might also meet all of his obligations 
and efface a certain detachment from his television and popcorn while critically questioning 
whether he ought to be playing video games or sleeping instead.  He would thereby have slipped 
past Adams’s conditions.  The strength of this example is its uncontrivance.  People can 
earnestly convince themselves that they are living a good life, even explicitly in God’s light, 
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 Ibid., p200 
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while they fritter their lives away gorging on junk food and watching ‘reality’ television.  
Moreover, most of them are not, strictly speaking, immoral people— they meet their obligations 
and obey all social laws. 
 Adams’s ethical theory accomplishes too much by the second horn, because the 
“universal character of true love for the good” coupled with a world filled with value provides a 
bar no one can meet.  Adams notes that our limited attentional capacities mean we will have to 
care about some goods more than others and that a person can meet his ideal while ignoring 
whole ranges of excellence. Yet he also holds that a love for a good is idolatrous if it keeps one 
from caring about other instances or types of good. 27  To which we might ask, ‘well, which is 
it?’  To keep out the gluttonous sloth, it will have to be the emphasis on love-for-the-good’s 
universal character.  Further, it will have to be more than a vague ‘in principle’ caring for all 
goods, because my counterexample meets that condition.  The ‘in principle’ will need to be 
enacted by caring, at least enough to recognize their value, all those goods with which one comes 
into contact.  But in that case, everyone has fallen almost equally short of this standard, for the 
experience of a single day is filled to the brim with more excellences than could be appreciated 
in many lifetimes.  Look around yourself for all the individuated excellences picked out by the 
transcendent standard.  Does what you see come from nature or is it the product of human 
ingenuity?  Does it speak of vegetative, animalistic, or humanistic capacities?  On this standard, 
caring about anything long enough to really appreciate it makes everyone an idolater.  
 The same issue arises in Finite’s theory of wellbeing.  What is good for oneself is even 
more apt to repugnant parody than ethical ordering, because it lacks ethical constraints.  Bad art 
is explicitly in, leaving open what art is at all, so a person can do very well for themselves by 
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enjoying Nancy Grace and pornography.  Doesn’t the technical expertise of at least those 
talented persons who direct and produce and edit these cultural artifacts bespeak an excellence in 
their product?  I think drug and alcohol use are in too.  The feeling of drunkenness or ætheric 
numbness is testament to the brilliance of humanity’s ingenuity in their creation.  Further, the 
body’s ability to metabolize this pleasurable poison is an excellent physical capacity as much as 
the body’s ability to swim or climb.  Through patience and effort, a drunk might work up to 
astounding heights of intoxication and accomplish an epic, and distinctly human, feat in driving 
home that is the equivalent of an Everest or English Channel.   
 A theistic view of man’s fallen nature may support either conclusion to the dilemma 
posed above.  After all, everyone falls short of their ideal and no one cares about all of the goods 
around them as they should.  No person is innocent of sin.  But in that case, is Finite an ethical 
theory or a theistic condemnation of ethics?  Or perhaps Finite should only be taken as a 
metaphysical thesis on value.  Of course it is an ethical theory, as can be seen in its taking 
substantive positions on controversial ethical views.  Further, we can see in its core approach to 
excellence, witnessed in III.2, that it looks to root in commonsense examples of exemplary 
goodness.  The problem of the good’s practical vacuity and the ethical conclusions it generates 
only come from stretching excellence too thin.  Adams objects to an Aristotelian notion of the 
virtuous mean, because he sees extravagant, transcendent virtue witnessed in saints as at least 
equally important.  He also takes as absurd the idea of getting a bull’s-eye in the messy and 
complex ethical decisions of life suggest by complete virtue.28  Alternately, the problem with 
applying a transcendent standard to a human ethical ideal is at least as problematic.  Either the 
target of your actions is so distant and small that the accuracy of your shot is wholly 
                                                          
28
 Ibid., p54 
18 
 
indeterminate, or targets surround you near and far such that you can hardly fail to miss if you 
develop the needed attitude.  
V. Higher-order Values and Affections    
 Given Finite’s metaphysical theory, I do not think its thin definition of love and 
excellence is implausible or unworkable.  Adams describes loves widely as “more serious, 
engage more of the self [than tastes], and involve attending with care to better and worse ways of 
relating to the object.”29  With this expansive notion of love, I think I can agree that all people, 
and maybe all values, should be treated with at least this thin form of love.  If I do not attend 
carefully, at least implicitly, to relate well to every person I meet, I am failing to respect them as 
I ought.  The theory also makes sense of why some people spend their lives studying things like 
broccoli or paper.  We might not ordinarily be inclined to call them beautiful or fascinating, but 
their depth of value is attested by the fact that some people of apparent virtue should find a 
lifetime of rewarding appreciation in them. 
 So my conclusion from Finite’s problems of practical reason, ethics, and wellbeing 
generated by the expansion of excellence argued above is not that its expansion should be 
rejected, but that it is deficient in an account of higher-order excellence and love.  These would 
be those deeper goods and loves which are necessary conditions to a good life or motivational 
ideal.  By such a condition of necessity, it would limit the burden of idolatry avoidance to a 
manageable set of excellences to love.  In turn, the weak conditions on ethical ordering and 
wellbeing would be strengthened past a motivational ideal of base biological drives to keep out 
the slothful glutton as a fitting ideal.  The vacuum of practical reason would be likewise filled-in 
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by securing the discrimination between higher and lower goods needed for judgments and their 
expression.  
 There are important problems with this general formulation, because the appropriate 
criterion could not be ad hoc and would still need to respect the expansion of excellence.  That 
is, it would need to provide a hermeneutic for how so-called lower goods like broccoli could 
become higher goods in a biological or artistic study.  Even the worst ‘art’ like ‘reality’ 
television seems to show a certain degree of excellence when it is the focus of a sociological or 
comedic approach.  Approaches of this kind are important components of many meaningful, 
virtuous lives, so the standard would need to account for their plurality created by this personal, 
attitudinal component.  The complexity of these approaches alone, understood along the lines of 
Rawls’s Aristotelian principle, would not suffice, because mindless sloth can bespeak an 
admirable sophistication.   
 Problems for the proposed supplementation go deeper because higher goods are not just 
parasitic on lower goods; lower goods are also parasitic on higher goods.  The achievement of 
recognizing any excellence as excellent or appreciating anything with the fullness of love is only 
accomplished by higher goods.  A prime example of this is that a person must have a close, 
loving relationship with another person to really know what love is at all.  Actually loving 
anyone, hence fully appreciating their excellence, even in a thin way, will require such a 
relationship.  Here, Adams fails to devote sufficient attention to the relation between particulars 
and extended particulars. If I really recognize excellence in gourmet meals, it will be because of 
extended experience with higher goods like cooking or savoring.   In Finite’s terms, some goods 
offer a deeper, more fecund glimpse of transcendence.   
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 This last point leads to two more.  The first is that exemplary goods like a loving 
relationship are also necessary for any achieved depiction of the transcendent Good, so are 
necessary for Finite’s transcendence thesis.  That is, knowing God’s nature implicitly or 
explicitly requires extended experience with higher goods, so my suggested supplementation will 
also be a required epistemological treatment.  The ideal of love for the good, to be meaningful or 
efficacious, requires it.  The second is that the needed criterion would also provide a sufficient 
condition (outside of God) for wellbeing and an ethical ideal.  Higher goods like a mutually 
loving interpersonal relationship are genuine ethical achievements, and themselves order a 
person’s values in a deep way.  If the love is to be more than an infatuation or obsession, the 
“relating better or worse” to the object will involve self-sculpting of one’s values to be worthy of 
the relationship.  Loving experience with one exemplary good will not suffice for such a self-
sculpting, because the conditions of efficacious love require a similar understanding of other 
excellences.30  Thus the criterion would provide a rough rule for a web of higher goods loved as 
a dynamic whole and in this way be sufficient to avoid idolatry and integrate one’s values.  
VI. Conclusion 
 The supplementary criterion of higher excellences I am suggesting will need to carry a 
heavy load to satisfy Finite’s extensive needs.  It must mark those more excellent excellences 
and loves which provide both the necessary and sufficient conditions of wellbeing and an ethical 
ideal.  A treatment of necessary goods would then provide a suitable standard of idolatry and 
provide needed delimitation of what counts as an ethical and well-lived life.  The sufficient 
condition would have to be met by roughly defining the dynamic interplay between loves by 
which a person comes to a fuller appreciation of necessary excellences.   At the same time, it 
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would need to respect the transcendent standard of excellence by stipulating how lower-order 
goods are transformed into higher-order goods and how the discernment and love, however thin, 
of lower goods is parasitic on higher goods.  The satisfaction of these needs will be taken up in 
chapter III. 
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CHAPTER II 
PROBLEMS IN TALBOT BREWER’S THE RETRIEVAL OF ETHICS 
I. Introduction 
 The Retrieval of Ethics argues a radical theory of dynamic practical reason and 
epistemology to support its theory of ethics in the good life as pleasant absorption in unimpeded 
activity.  Brewer sees the need for radical revision in the diverse array of assumptions in theories 
of philosophical psychology and ethics which are wholly foreign to Aristotelian virtues and 
thereby block their application.  I will attempt to focus on its unique theories of epistemology-as-
practical-reason and the good.  My goal in this chapter is to construct an interpretation of 
Retrieval which announces its radicalism and the deficiencies which this radicalism generates.  
After an extremely rough sketch of Retrieval’s theory as whole, I will focus on the essential 
thesis of its philosophical psychology.  My assertion is that this thesis is best understood as the 
primacy of the practical perspective and that the epistemology it generates is both attractive and 
deeply problematic.  My conclusion is that Retrieval is deficient in a treatment of objectivity and 
that its psychology of practical reason calls for abatement.                 
II. Summary 
 Retrieval’s ethical theory is predicated on a metaethical theory of practical reason and the 
self.   The aim is to, by a theory of moral psychology, build normativity into a theory of practical 
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reason. Retrieval offers a theory of the self as equally doer and experiencer in which what is 
experienced both structures practical reasoning and is structured by practical reasons.  The self’s 
evaluative outlook inescapably structures its experience and its experience structures how it will 
reason to act. This is where his metaethical theory arrives: the perspective of practical reason 
depends on the objective, external, irreducible, and monistc nature of goods.  These are the 
goods which our evaluative outlooks track and by which we constantly sculpt our evaluative 
understanding through considered judgments and thereby the actions which surge forth from this 
understanding.  Because a person’s evaluative outlook structures the ethically salient features of 
his circumstances and thereby structures his ethical actions, the achievement of a subtle and self-
affirmable evaluative understanding is a person’s central ethical achievement.  To the extent that 
a person brings her evaluative seemings (desires and pleasures) into accord with their considered 
evaluative judgments (reasoning) so that her actions are generally harmonious and pleasant, to 
that extent the person is a fully formed and autonomous self.   
 The metaethical and ethical theories turn largely on the importance of dialectical 
activities and evaluative outlooks.  Activities as diverse as baseball, parenting, mathematics, 
philosophy, chess, and cooking can be considered dialectical.  Dialectical activities are those 
complex and typically rewarding activities in which a running sense of, and appreciative 
absorption in, their value and constitutive standards are essential to participation.  They also offer 
ever more depth of discernment of their value and how best to act on this value through further 
experience with the activities— engagement in the activity provides a dialectic of improved 
appreciation and participation.  It is essential to full appreciation and participation in dialectical 
activities that they be undertaken and valued for their own sake, because instrumental valuing 
robs them of completion as pleasurable. 
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 At the substantive level, dialectical activities fit our intuitions of intrinsically valuable 
activities, are represented in our relationships and structured lives, are our primary and most 
fecund source of pleasure, and defy the frame of productionism.  They are the sorts of activities 
which people devote their lives to and by which almost all people structure their lives.  As 
regards Brewer’s ethical theory, they demonstrate by these properties the plausibility of defining 
the good life as one constituted by unimpeded activity.31  Their dependence and sculpture of 
achieved evaluative understanding and the importance of achieved evaluative understanding to 
ethical action makes them important sources of ethical value.  The virtues become important to 
the dialectical theory of the good life not as mere moralism or appeal to intuition, but as essential 
components of the firm evaluative outlook which make dialectical activities possible.  In the 
ideal case the virtues make possible success in the highest dialectical activity of ordering 
subsidiary activities in a happy and full life. 
 Goods are external because we do not judge our desires to be tracking themselves, but 
what is desirable in the world.  Goods are objective because we evaluate our desires for goods to 
discern whether they are real goods such that our actions will not be arbitrary or disastrous.  I 
have a desire to be happy, there is heroin in front of me, and perhaps I desire the heroin to the 
end of becoming happy.  I contemplate and check my desire because I understand that shooting 
up would not be good.  I realize it is objectively bad because I would not judge anyone in my 
situation to be doing something good, for themselves or otherwise.  I would instead say they 
judged incorrectly in mistaking a counterfeit good to be a real good.   
 Goods are irreducible because the appropriateness of responses to goods and bads in the 
world is acutely particularized such that a reduction to reasons-for or natural properties only 
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obscures rather than clarifies this particularity.  Reduction to reasons-for endlessly postpones an 
explanation of apt responses’ particularity, because the appropriate response was caused by the 
reasons for the appropriate response which was the appropriate response caused by the reasons 
for, etc.  The paradox lies in the fact that when we reason practically we do not reason from 
reason for response but to reasons for response.  Naturalistic reductions will not work because 
they violate the ontological scruples which are their impetus.  If goodness is a non-natural 
property occasioned by natural properties, as e.g. Moore held, then there are normative non-
natural reasons to posit goodness of certain natural properties.   The naturalistic reductivist “must 
see purely natural facts as something other than purely natural facts in order to see reasons 
aright… the problem is that if natural facts are reasons, their status as reasons seems to be 
something strictly additional to their status as natural facts.”32   
 The dualistic view of goods, inherited from Sidgwick and largely assumed among 
modern perspectives, is that moral value and personal happiness are distinct pursuits.33  Brewer 
rejects dualism in favor of a similar rejection he sees in Plato and Aristotle.  The good is 
monistic (just meaning non-dualistic) because the self as a continuous practical reasoner is 
constituted by its coherence and continuity of pursuits, which must be guided by an equivalently 
coherent and continuous pursuit of goods.  A person is only an agent to the extent that she 
reasons from a monistic conception of the good, because otherwise her autonomy dissolves into 
the incoherent and discontinuous pursuit of competing desires after competing goods.   Thus a 
person who does not possess a minimal threshold of impersonally good virtue cannot be 
attributed personal goods because he is so internally conflicted that he cannot be said to have a 
self to which we might attribute goods.  Moral good is thus not a distinct type of good: it is part 
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of the monistic good because the value of morality depends on value generally (e.g. people, art, 
relationships). 
 This theory of the good is related to the virtues and to the ethical values of decisions and 
actions through a theory of action which is almost entirely based in evaluation. Virtues are 
essential for the clarity they give by way of avoidance of counterfeit seemings of goodness.  
Attainment of the ideal human life is activity towards the highest good of understanding the 
goods in all of one’s activities and ordering them appropriately.  Completion of this highest good 
requires appreciative, pleasurable absorption in those activities and a certain amount of good 
luck to avoid tragedies like war and famine which might make one’s life go badly.  It also 
requires character friendships, valued intrinsically, with other pursuers after virtue, beginning 
with a decent upbringing.  These character friendships are the dialectic mechanism of shared 
evaluative outlooks, evaluative outlooks which monisticaly track goods, and evaluative 
understandings which can order the life-dialectic and the soul.  
III. Methodological Interpretation 
 In this section I dig deeper into Brewer’s theory of practical reason and argue that it is 
more radical than Brewer realizes.  I expound on three features which suggest a radical 
psychological theory: evaluative inescapability, destruction of the practical/theoretical divide, 
and a phenomenology of practical primacy.   Together these features yield a thesis of the 
primacy of the practical perspective or what I will alternately call practical primacy or the 
principle of practical primacy.  This is a psychological thesis which couches epistemology in a 
perspectival theory or practical reason, and hence in the perspective of the practical reasoner.   
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III.1 First feature: Evaluative Inescapability  
 The constant fundamentality of evaluative outlooks is the most basic point on which the 
other two hang.  As mentioned above, Retrieval’s ethical theory is founded on the achievement 
of an evaluative outlook which tracks the objective normative features of one’s circumstances.   
The achieved evaluative outlook is also partly constituted by a pre-reflective and proto-
evaluative outlook which structures one’s experiences and characteristic judgments.  These 
structuring features are the emotions, desires, and pleasures.34  Evaluative reflection on pre-
reflective/reflective cohesion and whether one’s desires, pleasures and emotions are felicitous in 
tracking and acting on goods, can reshape their structure.35    Yet evaluative reflection and the 
considered judgments which might initiate reflection are in turn dependent on the more primary 
evaluative outlook.  
 Evaluative inescapability runs deep as a product of Brewer’s rejection of the description/ 
evaluation divide36 which is in turn a product of rejecting the belief/desire divide37 and the 
division of pre-deliberative/post-deliberative stages of practical reason.38   It is not merely that 
evaluations are essential to experience such that evaluative judgments always follow experience, 
but that a person’s evaluative judgments are built into experience itself.  In this way, the objects 
and relations of the world are experienced with the marks of practical reason as pre-judgment 
features of one’s circumstances.  This opens up the primacy of the practical perspective (I’ll call 
this ‘practical primacy’) because any experience will contain the structure of practical reason.  
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Since experience is to be regarded as inherently practical, it will always be fit to the practical 
reasoner’s perspective. 
III.2 Second feature: destruction of the practical/theoretical division 
 The destruction of the practical/theoretical division begins in the demonstration that 
practical and theoretical reason are so intertwined that there is no objective and purely theoretical 
perspective from which to doubt the reality of practical reasons.  This point goes deeper than the 
common realist assertion that metaphysical and epistemological theories rely on normative 
components.  An anti-realist might allow that uncontroversial  normativity, e.g. of the kind that 
generates near-unanimous consensus among scientists, is needed to reach the objectivity of 
ethical anti-realism.  She might then hold that the normative standard which produces anti-
realism is markedly less subjective and controversial than ethical or aesthetic normativity.  
Brewer’s theory defies this anti-realism because it not only builds the perspective of practical 
reason into our experience of the world, which might allow theoretical abstraction.  It also builds 
the perspective of practical reason into the contours of theoretical reason itself.  Indeed, 
dialectical activities display the fluency between practical and theoretical reason because our 
actions in dialectical activities are continually guided by an evolving understanding of the 
activity and our circumstances.  The way the world appears and how we act in it are 
fundamentally connected; theoretical reason is itself sculpted by practical reason.   
 It might be objected, however, that the fusion of practical and theoretical reason is only 
present in rare cases of dialectical absorption.  The answer to this objection will turn on an 
expansion of practical/theoretical fluency to all reasoning.  First, this objection fails because 
while dialectical activities play a special role in shaping experience of practical reason, practical 
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reasoning never ceases because the evaluative outlook is inescapable. Second, it fails because 
our lives are inescapable dialectical activities, which means that any action or reasoning may be 
considered as a non-atomistic part of a dialectical whole.  This lends the further thought that 
there are no deep differences between activities and actions or activity and reason.  An action is 
always a practical activity.  A bout of reasoning is always an (mental) action. Third, it fails 
because theoretical reasoning of the most celebrated and perspicacious type is itself a 
paradigmatic dialectical activity.  Theoretical reasoning is always shaped in its contours and 
progressions by the internalized evaluative norms which are constitutive of its type.39  By 
example, the mathematician does not become aware of lines of thought or avenues of 
progression and then judge them to be worth consideration.  This would be a weaker claim of 
normativity’s requirement.  Rather, what lines of thought are open for consideration or feel 
promising will be structured by her achieved evaluative understanding of mathematics.   
 There is neither purely theoretic experience of the world for reason to theorize from, nor 
purely theoretical reasoning which might abstract from the practical structure of experience.  
Brewer consistently describes practical and theoretical reason as intertwined, but if my 
interpretation is correct then he is downplaying his position— practical and theoretical reason are 
dual aspects of a single faculty.  Practical primacy gains support from this feature because the 
perspective of practical reason not only permeates the external world of experience, but the 
internal world of thought and reason.       
III.3 Third feature: the phenomenology of practical primacy 
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 The arguments above suffice to establish practical primacy as the best characterization of 
Brewer’s moral psychology.  This characterization also illuminates Retrieval’s reliance on the 
phenomenology of the practical perspective.  Appeals to phenomenology back up both 
evaluative inescapability and the theoretical/practical union.  Evaluative inescapability as a thesis 
of the practical shape of experience finds credibility in the phenomenal commonality of 
experiences which initiate automatic actions.  When I take a step into a crosswalk and see a 
speeding truck closing in on where I will shortly be, the experience of ‘get back’ is 
phenomenally indistinguishable from ‘speeding truck’.   
 Evaluative inescapability is observable in the tendency of practices and activities to 
spread this phenomenal fusion of practical and theoretical features.   A seasoned and lifelong 
practitioner or connoisseur of nearly anything finds that their prior activities sculpt their 
experience generally.40  A seasoned libertarian does not have to be in ‘libertarian mode’ to see 
any experience with government as tyrannical or any shortcoming in society as the cause of 
regulation.  The experiences show up with these features attached.  The phenomenological 
backing of practical reasons in theoretical reasoning takes a similar form.  Certain lines of 
thought will appear, while possible others, most of which would be faulty, will not.  Further, the 
promising lines will feel promising and those which promise revelatory connections or a true and 
nascent originality will feel particularly exciting or captivating.    
 The phenomenology of practical primacy is also appealed to in Brewer’s account of 
dialectical activities41 and his argument for appreciative attention in loving desires.42  It is the 
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foundation of Retrieval’s theory of attentional pleasure in activity and passivity43 which 
demonstrates the necessity of valuing one’s doings and the ethical significance of pruning 
desires.  Phenomenological expositions also establish the particularity of values, the value of 
persons, the danger of evaluative numbness, and the connection between particularized attitudes 
and value realism.44 The phenomenology of the practical perspective completes the picture of 
practical primacy as the characteristic stance of Brewer’s perspectival theory of practical reason.   
 Practical primacy’s pride of place is demonstrated throughout Retrieval in its rejections 
of deflationary views as “reflectively untenable from the perspective of practical reason.”  It is 
the basis for Brewer’s denials of generalism, anti-realism, subjectivism, internalism, and 
reductivism.  As such, it is the backbone of his value realism and his substantive ethical system 
which relies on a peculiar and realistic view of goodness that might be otherwise implausible.   
 As a psychological thesis, practical primacy possesses a radicalism which is difficult to 
exaggerate.  It illicits a subjective theory of epistemology that provides an integration of value 
and opens up an extensive phenomenology of ethical action and thought.   It simultaneously 
guarantees the objectivity of this integrative phenomenology.  The firm base of its 
epistemological weight is the elimination of the description/evaluation divide, which I think has 
a decidedly greater area of effect than any rejection of the fact/value divide.  Whether this 
radicalism proves untenable or untamable is taken up below.   
III.4 Practical primacy’s problem of narrativity  
 Brewer appeals to a theory of the self as a narrative entity in numerous and important 
arguments throughout Retrieval.  The importance and objectivity of continuity and narrativity is 
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predicated on Brewer’s notion of practical primacy, but it is also a distinctly contested feature of 
the first personal perspective in wider philosophical discussion.  As such, a perusal of temporal 
continuity and narrativity’s place in Retrieval along with detractors of narrativity will begin to 
illuminate the shortcomings of practical primacy. 
 Brewer’s argument for the dialectical life leans heavily on the importance of narrative 
continuity; “The self that pursues an understanding of its own guiding concerns will generally 
find that these concerns take on a more finely articulated shape as pursuit advances.”45  This is a 
solid statement of the relation between dialectical desires and dialectical activities considered 
from the first-personal perspective over a whole life.  Appeal to narrative continuity is also one 
of the principal arguments for Brewer’s theory of dialectical activities and desires.  Dialectical 
desires, and the dialectical activities of which they are a part, can change their form and generate 
massively disparate actions.  Instrumental and calculative theories of action cannot make good 
sense of this continuity because “what seems from the first-personal standpoint… to be growth is 
reduced to mere change.”46  Alternately, what is experienced first-personally or interpreted by a 
“sympathetic biographer” as “greater clarity, depth, or excellence” is reduced to “a series of 
unrelated shifts in one’s behavior.”47    
 Practical thinking is analogous to the author’s task of completing his unfinished book’s 
narrative.48  Narrative activities are those which bring our lives into a unity in the present and 
support our intuitions of fortunate and unfortunate lives and deaths.49  We also rely on narratives 
in others’ lives to interpret and discern the value and place of our own life projects and to give 
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substance to our obligations based on a shared narrative.50  The common thread among these 
assertions is their alleged derivation from the primacy of the practical perspective.  Narrativity is 
offered as an essential feature of first-personal practical experience for which a theory of action 
must account to avoid violation of practical primacy. 
 What, though, of those practical reasoners who feel no sense of narrativity or continuity 
in their lives?  Galend Strawson attests to feel no sense of narrativity and very little of continuity 
in his life.51  What is more, he has scoured for non-narratives among historical artists and 
philosophers and finds similar sentiments among Michel de Montaigne, Henry James, the Earl of 
Shaftesbury, Bob Dylan, Geronwy Rees, and Sartre.  Dan Dennett claims to support narratively 
structuring lives as common and distinctly human, but also finds that of course they are 
obviously fictions.52   
 These first-personal appeals against narrativity are particularly troublesome for Brewer 
because they arise out of the same perspective from which he appeals for narrativity.  Brewer’s 
theory rests serious weight on narrative continuity to argue his theory of dialectical activity.  If 
Strawson and Dennett’s views hold water then this essential feature of Brewer’s ethics is in 
trouble, because the practical perspective could then be turned upon by what Strawson calls 
‘Episodics’ to refute the specialness of dialectical activities.  Of particular relevance is that these 
views cast doubts on practical primacy because they illustrate our human flair for arbitrariness 
and the imposition of importance.  In so illustrating, they show a worry of vacuity in appeals to 
‘the perspective of practical reason’ or ‘the first-personal perspective’ because it is the nature of 
these perspectives that there be no ‘the’ but only ‘a’ or ‘many’. 
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 There is also the danger that practical primacy yields a multitude of realisms that it would 
be better not to yield.  Almost no one’s life is particularly narrative in its whole or even simply 
through its important parts, because few people possess the sense of purpose or aptitude for 
continual self-improvement which is a hallmark of the dialectical life.  Alternately, practical 
primacy may authorize a system of narratives which are nearly entirely false and which roundly 
contradict each other.  Episodes of ‘reality television’ usually derive from hundreds of hours of 
tape showing no narrative to a passably narrative forty minutes of heavily chopped and edited 
video.  Brewer’s narrative exemplar in St. Augustine as a medieval Newt Gingrich does not 
quash these issues but only magnifies them.  These problems with narrativity point to a larger 
problem of subjectivism in practical primacy to which I now turn.   
IV. Practical Idealism and Transcendence 
 In this section the interpretive thrust begun above is furthered by drawing out the 
implications of practical primacy in a fully formed normative epistemology I call ‘practical 
idealism’.   Brewer’s theory is best understood as practical idealism because it shares 
informatively analogous features and problems with transcendental idealism.  A cursory 
development of practical idealism leads quickly to a need for supplementation with a 
transcendental good and associated issues. 
IV.1 Practical idealism and transcendental good 
 The stated thrust of argumentation at several and unrelated points in Retrieval is to 
dispute what is called the “Kantian picture” of practical reason as it has shaped both Kantian and 
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non-Kantian interpretations of the structure of practical reason.53  The Kantian view separates 
practical and theoretical reason into temporally and conceptually distinct episodes of thought.  
One important aspect of the Kantian picture of practical reason is its relation to the Kantian 
picture of theoretical reason, i.e. transcendental idealism.  By rejection of the Kantian picture of 
practical reason, Brewer also rejects the Kantian picture of epistemology.  Transcendental 
idealism (on the canonical interpretation as epistemological) shares certain interesting 
methodological similarities with Brewer’s epistemology despite its being an abjectly different 
approach.  Both theories turn on psychological theses, employ principles of significance derived 
from psychology, posit proto-cognitive structural features of human experience, assert an 
objective and abiding structure of experience, and aim to limit the pretensions of theories which 
violate the condition of this structure.   
 In light of their similarities, I suggest that the theory Brewer establishes in transcendental 
idealism’s place is best understood as practical idealism.  Practical idealism is an apt title for 
Brewer’s normative epistemology because of the most important shared feature with 
transcendental idealism: both deny access to the world-as-it-is-in-itself while also securing the 
objectivity and reality of this world.  On practical idealism’s formulation, this is the view that the 
experiencer’s experience is shaped by her developed practical outlook such that purely theoretic 
experience of the world is impossible.  Practical idealism treats the problem of access to the 
world of value as distinct from experience by its own discursivity thesis: experience and reason 
are discursive of the reality and objectivity of value.  This discursivity just is the thesis of 
practical primacy.  Negatively, it is the claim that a philosophical position grounded in 
experience is not being accurate of that experience if it does not include its practical contours.    
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 Its recurrent transcendental-style arguments begin from the core supposition of practical 
primacy— that our experience and reason are essentially practical.  Then, those skeptical or 
reductive theories of the good are shown to violate key features of the good that are necessary 
conditions of practical reason.  Since the good is found necessary for experience and reason, it 
cannot be intelligibly considered as unreal, internal, or subjective.  Such considerations founder 
by contradiction of the perspective from which they arise.  Thus, reductive or subjective theories 
of value are practically transcendent because they violate practical primacy.  The good, 
understood in abstraction as the class of all particular goods or practical reasons, is the 
transcendental object of practical idealism.  Its reality, objectivity, and externality are not secured 
by practical primacy per se, but by the impossibility (which follows from practical primacy) of 
thinking otherwise. 
 But the individual’s experience of the good is itself subjectively value-laden because 
affected by his own personal and unique evaluative scheme.  In addition, Brewer’s standard of 
objectivity in evaluative outlooks on the world is structured along coherentist lines as constituted 
by self-affirmability and a self-consistent conceptual scheme.  Coherentism compounds the 
problem by the typical objection that coherence does not yield correspondence, in this case to the 
good.  This line of thought quickly leads to the concern, broached in the previous section, that 
practical primacy generates the specter of subjectivism for practical idealism.  Epistemic 
subjectivism, understood from the perspective of practical reason, is the worry that key features 
of agents’ ethical lives which rely on the fundamental sharedness of the experience of value are 
foregone.  One is autonomy, because it relies on the monistically coherent and largely correct 
identification of the good.  Others are the recognition of value of persons and, relatedly, shared 
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activities and communication, because they rely on trust that others’ share “an experience of the 
world that runs deep”.54 
 The issue here turns on Brewer’s view that practical reasons not only structure experience 
and so structure the material by which theoretical and practical reason work, but are also the 
product of individuals’ particular experiences and activities.  The practical contours of current 
experience are heavily influenced by the experiencer’s previous experiences.  This is shown in 
the phenomenological distinctness of a single experience among a variety of persons with 
distinct practical backgrounds.  When we consider our experiences “what we will find… are a 
series of apprehensions that already bear the marks of our practical concerns” and since our 
practical concerns fill the world and are shaped by our practices, our experiences are 
irreconcilably distinct.  On this point Brewer gives the example of the sound of a motorized saw 
operated by a carpenter as experienced by carpenter, mechanic and sound artist.55  The pre-
reflective outlooks of the carpenter whose experience of the sound automatically guides her 
motions, the mechanic whose experience indicates worn bearings, and the artist whose 
experience indicates incorporation into an ongoing composition, all shape their various 
experiences.56  
 From the above described situation, I think a thicker role of the transcendental good can 
now be seen.  It must secure the objectivity of practical reason through grounding these various 
perspectives in a maximally shared practical structure.  The problem is obviously that it is the 
nature of practical primacy that each should not be able to experience the practical contours of 
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the others.  The mechanic is likely to guffaw at the sound artist’s claim to hear beauty in a buzz 
saw.  In the mundane occurrence described above, not much is lost by this incommensurability.  
Yet, when such an event is one of the frequent high-stakes ethical occurrences involving two 
people of widely different experiential backgrounds, the problems of communication and 
understanding can be quite grave.  To begin the answer to this problem, I think that practical 
idealism only requires objectivity defined as maximal intersubjectivity between practical 
reasoners.  Why should intersubjectivity be the standard?  First, because it is the only standard of 
objectivity open to practical idealism, because practical primacy establishes as many experienced 
realities as there are practical reasoners.  Second, because by practical primacy, if this is the only 
standard of objectivity open to practical idealism and it is necessary for practical reason, then 
there is no other intelligible form of objectivity.   
 Given objectivity-as-intersubjectivity, still, this just delays the answer to the worry of 
subjectivism.  For, what is this transcendental good such that it would secure intersubjectivity 
among practical reasoners?  The standards this good must meet become even more stringent 
when the characteristics of the good’s role in Retrieval are considered.  The good is asserted to 
be fundamentally mysterious and ineffable at the first order perspective— it transcends capture 
or full articulation.57  Yet its mystery goes deeper, because on Retrieval’s fluid theory of 
practical reason an agent engaged in dialectical activity is primarily attentive to the “nature and 
point of what [she] is doing” and not her circumstances.58  This is because it is not just that goods 
must be external, but that they are only discernible internally to the activity.59 Dialectical 
activities drive Brewer’s theory of practical reason because to be the temporally extended actions 
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we take them to be, the internal good which drives our participation by a continually refined 
appreciation must be already wholly present.  We struggle for a good already intimated, but 
imperfectly realized.  The blues singer who struggles to perfect her performance of a song 
struggles, on Brewer’s theory, to understand and bring about a good (the performance she is 
attempting) which is already the basis of her activity.60  The good is externally real but only 
discernible internally and also both wholly present and non-actualized.  
 The role of the transcendental good must also be the underpinning of goods found by 
practical reason to be both plural and monistic.  Plural because there are a wide array of goods 
internal to different dialectical activities and to the infinite variety of orderings which might 
constitute a good life which is distinctly one’s own.  Monistic because there is no deep 
distinction between personal and impersonal goods, and because the goods pursued in dialectical 
activities share a commonality in constituting dialectical activities.  The good as plural and 
monistic further suggests that the transcendental good must ground an ordering relation among 
practical goods.  There must be this ordering relation in Retrieval because the value of dialectical 
activities (which Brewer sees as representing our most valuable and personal doings) is 
constituted by both internal experience and their place in ordering a good human life.61  Because 
this ordering is itself the unshirkable dialectical activity of a lived life and so must have its own 
constitutive good that drives the ordering; there must be a highest good by which the values of 
the others are ordered.  That is, the transcendental good must also secure the objectivity of the 
eudaimon life. 
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 A further constraint on this transcendental good is that it cannot be metaphysical or part 
of a supersensible reality, as Kant’s transcendental object is canonically taken to be.  This is 
because Retrieval requires of the good that it be real by its practical efficacy, not a “bald 
intuition” of the good’s ontological reality.62  Practical primacy reveals value’s “non-absurd 
realism” by its necessary place to understand “the nature and point of human life” as we live it.  
Because philosophy is a valuable activity internal to the lived life, it has no external base from 
which to curtail the fundamental needs of human moral psychology.  So, the transcendental good 
must be conceived as a fit object by which to reason practically.  The solution can, once again, 
be understood by analogy to transcendental idealism, but this time from a non-canonical 
perspective.  Henry Allison has argued persuasively (to my mind) that the transcendental object, 
to escape the problem of Jacobian affectation, be conceived as a purely epistemic thesis.63  Along 
the same lines, the transcendental good would offer a common epistemic structuring of practical 
reason to which practical reasoners might appeal. 
V. Retrieval’s mechanisms of securing objectivity 
 In a way, the concern of subjectivism I am pressing is just the other side of Brewer’s 
particularist ethical view in its collapse of the distinction between epistemology and value 
theory.  Though my own interpretation of Retrieval endeavors to illuminate the problem from an 
interpretive perspective, it is certainly anticipated by Brewer.  His mechanisms for securing 
evaluative objectivity among persons given the particularity of ethical judgments are three: 
character friendship, thick evaluative concepts, and the virtues.  The character virtues are 
epistemically important for the evaluative clarity they offer.  Here I will consider just character 
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friendship and thick evaluative concepts, as the virtue and vice terms are themselves part of the 
set of thick evaluative concepts.  I argue in this section that they are ultimately insufficient to 
dispel the shadow of subjectivism.   
V.1 Morality in character friendships 
 The right’s treatment in Retrieval is dependent on a social theory that involves character 
friendship and a background stock of virtues and thick evaluative concepts.64  In Retrieval, 
character friendship is a necessary component to a mature and subtle evaluative outlook. 
Character friendships act as the mechanism by which we hone our evaluative clarity in an effort 
to track objective goods.  At the same time that it makes possible the ordering of the good life, 
there is a sense in which it is able to do so by its intrinsic and transcendental value.  
Transcendental, because in its importance and moral capacity it might be considered the orderer 
of all value and that for which the individual orders his dialectics.   
 We must value the friendship for its own intrinsic value to reap the benefits of virtue and 
the expansion of our evaluative outlook which produces intersubjective self-affirmability and 
approaches universal self-affirmability in the ideal case.65  This is the introduction of specifically 
moral content into Retrieval’s ethical system, because when coupled with monism, good 
character friendships yield a telos of evaluative outlooks that can affirm their view of the good 
across a full range of instantiations in others.  Since to evaluate an action as good is to possess a 
reason for performing it, ethical actions are not universalizable but instead spring from a 
universalizable evaluative outlook.  The particularism of evaluations and universalism of 
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morality are united; the intersubjectivity of evaluative outlooks among distinct reasoners is 
secured. 
V.2 Why character friendship fails 
 The tests of intersubjective and universal self-affirmability go astray as attempts to 
introduce intersubjectivity or moral reasoning into Retrieval’s evaluation-based ethnics.  
Universal self-affirmability fails because it violates the practical scruples which motivate the 
particularist stance.  The universally self-affirmable outlook is an impossibility no matter how 
ideally a character friendship proceeds.  It requires an agent to affirm his own outlook across all 
counterfactual instantiations in any agent.66  The blacksmith who attains such a state must be 
able to affirm his evaluations in a President negotiating at Camp David, an astronaut repairing a 
space station, or a mother dealing with the complicated task of bartering her children.  We 
simply do not have access to such a possibility of considerations for the same reason ethics is 
uncodifiable as an endeavor of generalization: people do not have the mental capacity or 
experiential content to arrive at such broad conclusions.  Thick evaluative terms are not a merely 
useful hermeneutic. They are an essential feature of a confusing and intricate world of messy 
ethical decisions which we often second-guess in hindsight.     
 Intersubjective self-affirmability seems like it might do better, but fails because character 
friendship can too easily become an echo chamber of vicious outlooks.  Character friendships 
are, after all, how so many of the most pernicious and deep seated prejudices and flaws of 
evaluative understanding remain present in our ethical community.  Those with common 
evaluative understandings tend to group and reinforce, finding character friendship more natural.  
                                                          
66
 Ibid., p250 
43 
 
This is particularly the case when they feel their evaluative understandings to be socially 
diminished or even conspired against.  The phenomenon is often ethically innocuous or even 
valuable in the formation of most subcultures around shared deviances and stigmas which are 
themselves ill-founded.  An enthusiasm for steampunk or death metal are hardly distortions of 
the kind I mean and are likely valuable to the broader culture in broadening its evaluative clarity 
and  providing a hub of strong character friendship.    
 The serious problem for Brewer’s view is the formation of religious and secular 
subcultures around grossly distorted values such as protesting the funerals of gay veterans or 
plotting against the illusory threat of a global Zionist conspiracy.  More influential and pervasive 
than these are mainstream evaluative prejudices against races, sexualities, classes, etc.  Racists 
and sexists can find intersubjective self-affirmability in one another without problem.  Across 
indexicals, they can wholeheartedly affirm that were they a certain race or sex, or possessed the 
characteristics they see in another demographic, they would be objectively lesser.67  Or worse, a 
subjugated group can internalize a standard of inferiority that they feel is true and come to 
intersubjectively affirm their self-abasement.  What this shows is that grounding correctness or 
sharedness of evaluative understanding in character friendship is necessary but insufficiently 
strong. 
 Evaluations cannot come close to an objective standard of the world or value by character 
friendship considered in isolation, because as regards these shared evaluative blind spots it is as 
likely to reinforce vicious outlooks on the world and the good as virtuous ones.  To put the point 
epistemically, it is as likely to encourage a skewed structure of experience as a balanced, truth-
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tracking one.  An atomistic theory of character friendship simply cannot secure objectivity of 
experience or practical evaluation, because the sound artist and carpenter could become the 
closest of friends yet experience the same sounds as wholly different.   The subjectivity of 
experience poses particular problems for shared accounts of ethical events between two strangers 
who have disparate character friendships.   Atomistic character friendships simply cannot secure 
the sharedness and maximal intersubjectivity of experience for the same reason they cannot 
secure morality. 
V.3 Thick Evaluative Concepts 
 Thick evaluative concepts are important tools to guide our evaluative judgments as we 
discern and act in a world infused with normativity.  They are concepts that defy the 
evaluative/descriptive divide like: tactful, courageous, cruel, bold, lazy, selfish, and vain.  The 
sorting of thick evaluative concepts is, aside from character friendship, Brewer’s other major 
effort to head off this worry of practical subjectivism.  Thick evaluative concepts are essential to 
Brewer’s theory because they backup his particularism in acting as universals of particularized 
application and correspond with the virtues and vices.  Thick evaluative concepts also have a 
social aspect in being culturally received from one’s linguistic community and in Brewer’s test 
of decomposition by socio-historical considerations.  Brewer suggests a test of decomposition 
into descriptive and evaluative components which genuine thick evaluative concepts resist.  The 
nature of the test is to consider the thick evaluative concept’s socio-historical background such 
that its decomposition can be accounted for by its generation in a historically unjust evaluative 
outlook. By example, the ladylike can be decomposed by accounting for its tendency to “bolster 
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a dominant social role for males, flatter the male ego, and gratify male sexual fantasies.”68 It 
purports to track a genuine evaluative property which is in fact non-evaluative.   
 There are at least two problems with this test as it stands.  The first is that we can 
reasonably turn a cynical eye on most thick evaluative concepts considered in isolation, because 
of the historical tendency towards their corruption to exploit human moral psychology.  We 
might consider the courageous as an evaluative concept which puts an unjust thumb on the scales 
when a community is deliberating on war or that it has been historically employed by the old and 
the powerful to deceive passionate youths into killing each other.  The generous or charitable 
might be debunked by the Nietzschean claim that they are inventions of the weak to enslave the 
strong.  Even the most straightforward cases like the honest could be regarded as a tool of 
powerful and dishonest aristocrats to keep out competition from the lower classes by inculcating 
self-defeating values.   
 The second is that the self-aware perspective of those groups of people who are wrongly 
maligned by false evaluative concepts will be the basis of their correction.  An individual’s 
efforts to sort concepts in isolation or with a friend has not been the historical driver of 
evaluative progress.  Taking Brewer’s examples of the uppity or the ladylike, these terms would 
enjoy significantly more cultural currency today without the women’s and civil rights 
movements.  The brunt of the corrective process of the most misguided thick evaluative concepts 
is achieved through social awareness.  Often their revision is expressed in the cultural artifacts, 
like music and literature, of groups which are unfairly maligned.69  The sorting of thick 
evaluative concepts is not enough on its own to secure intersubjectivity, because it is the 
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recognition of another, or one’s own, group’s mistreatment by the concept that is the crucial step.  
It is such a recognition which is at stake in the problem of intersubjectivity. 
VI. Conclusion 
 The problem with practical primacy began in the aptness of narrative life-structure to 
gross distortions indicating subjective, constructed imposition.  Concerns of subjectivity gained 
full expression in my interpretation of Retrieval as based on a theory of practical idealism and 
the problem of shared experience.   The cause of concern is that practical idealism seems to 
generate a paradox between: (1) what the first-personal practical perspective demands by 
practical primacy for sharedness of value and experience (e.g. shared activities, character 
friendship, evaluative concept sorting, and recognition of human value) and (2) the experiential 
and subjective structure of that same perspective created by practical primacy (especially the 
dialectical shaping of practical reason, the destruction of theoretical/practical divide, and their 
combination in the practical structure of experience).  Though atomistic character friendship and 
thick evaluative concepts offer what can be accepted as necessary conditions for objectivity, they 
were found insufficient on their own.   
 Their consideration does, however, contribute a certain character to the problem of 
intersubjectivity.  The problem is that practical idealism seems to occlude truly shared 
experiences, meaningful communication, and character friendship between two people with a 
disparate evaluative outlook generated by their distinct practical experiences.  Indeed, even 
though they share a common culture and live eudaimonistic lives.  A shared source of evaluative 
outlooks on the good in thick evaluative concepts would need to be the epistemic feature of the 
transcendental good discussed in section IV.  The transcendental good would open up, at the 
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least, the possibility of shared views and communication on the ordering of thick evaluative 
concepts and character friendship.  That is, it will need to somehow incorporate the particularist 
mechanisms of thick evaluative concepts and character friendships into its structure. 
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CHAPTER III 
ADAMS AND BREWER REPAIR EACH OTHER 
I. Introduction 
 The two previous sections depicted two distinct approaches to ethics with distinct 
problems.  In this section, I will argue a compelling complementation between the two views— 
that each might correct the deficiency I have urged in the other.  Brewer’s largely Aristotelian 
theory of the good life in dialectical activities and character friendships solves Adams’s need for 
a criterion of higher goods.  Adams’s loosely Platonic theory of the transcendent Good and its 
relational ordering of value solve Brewer’s need for a shared source of value among practical 
reasoners.  The shape of this section, then, will be a narrow synthesis of the two views.  I call it a 
narrow synthesis because while I think they line up along the dimensions I discuss, I will not 
argue any wide-ranging synthesis of interlocking positions in the two theories.  The burden of 
my proposed synthesis is much lighter than that.  All I aim to accomplish here is the 
demonstration that the weaknesses I have pointed to in each theory can be largely remedied by 
features of the other.   
 I begin this synthesis by demonstration of Brewer’s account of dialectical activities as a 
necessary and sufficient criterion for Adams’s ethical theory.  I then turn to Brewer’s theory, 
beginning with an interpretation of the thinly transcendent good as already present and the 
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possibility that Adams’s thick transcendence would offer the needed element of objectivity.  
From there, I develop a sketch of a social and epistemic transformation of transcendence from 
God to community.  I conclude the section by way of a synthesized view of morality taken from 
the practical perspective’s incorporation of the community.    
II. A dialectical standard for Finite 
 In this subsection, I argue the fitness of Brewer’s theory of dialectical activities as 
Finite’s needed criterion of higher-order excellences. 
II.1 A statement of the problem and the character of dialectical activities 
 At the end of section A, I offered a very general formulation of the criterion of higher 
excellences Finite requires to resolve the problems generated by its expansion of excellence.  I 
stated there that the criterion of higher goods would need to meet some strict guidelines to offer 
the support Finite needs while also respecting Finite’s larger theoretical aims.  The three main 
problems with Finite that the criterion needs to solve are practical vacuity, the indeterminacy of 
its ethical theory, and an unsavory looseness in its theory of wellbeing.  My proposal must meet 
a standard of necessary features of those higher-order excellences that can constrain the needs of 
practical judgments and expression, the formation of an integrative ethical ideal and the goods 
which contribute to wellbeing.  It must also account for what are intuitively considered goods 
improper to love, like bacteria or a chair, could become higher goods, worthy of love, by certain 
approaches or attitudes.  As well, I stated that the standard would need to give an account of the 
achievement of coming to love or recognize excellences at all.  Lastly, I offered the more vague 
suggestion that the criterion might account for the sufficient conditions of a person’s ethical 
ordering of value and epistemic access to the features of transcendence. 
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 Brewer’s practical epistemology enumerated in his theory of dialectical activities, 
character friendship, and the good life provide precisely these needs.  The criterion of higher-
order excellences Finite requires is, I suggest, a criterion of dialectical activities and character 
friendships seen as constitutive of the good human life (friendship and life themselves both being 
dialectical activities).  I will first give a quick summation of dialectical activities and then fill in 
the theory by arguing its fit within Finite.  Dialectical activities and the goods picked out by 
dialectical activities are the kind which would be reasonable to love and which give the needed 
superlative sense to the excellences they involve. Dialectical activities are those complex, 
temporally extended activities which we “throw ourselves into” on an intimation of their intrinsic 
value and, once engaged, struggle to better understand their constitutive standards and the source 
of their value.  Examples of those goods we engage in dialectical activities are philosophy, the 
creation or appreciation of music, parenting, loving friendships and romantic relationships, 
athletics, meaningful conversation, the creation or appreciation of artwork, scientific inquiry, and 
mathematics.   
 What is common among this wide array of excellent activities is that their engagement 
cannot be fully articulated and none of their goods can really be explained to those that have not 
experienced them internally (a common experience for philosophers in particular).  Further, full 
participation in any of these activities requires attentional absorption and a running sense of their 
value for a person to really be participating in them.  If one does not see any point to what one is 
doing or one’s mind drifts free of one’s doings, then one ceases to fully participate in the 
activity.  A lack of full participation yields a corresponding lack of growth or enjoyment.  They 
all provide a depth of engagement which requires active participation to discern how to answer 
better and worse to the standards which constitute that engagement.  In a constant and fluid 
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process, as one comes through participation to better understand how to better engage in a 
dialectical activity, this is reflected in one’s participation and a further round of discernment 
through activity begins.  The deeper one’s appreciation of the activity, the better one comes to 
answer to this appreciation.  They also all involve constitutive standards which determine the 
character of engagement and whether a person engages in them at all.  Engaging in a 
conversation requires that I listen to my partner and respond aptly to what they say.  If I 
endeavor to engage in a conversation with a person, but ignore their expressions and fail to 
respond appropriately to what they say, then I have begun to engage in something besides 
conversation.70  
II.2 A dialectical standard as necessary condition 
 I suggest that dialectical activities, by their temporal extension, intrinsic value, and 
epistemic component, carve up excellences into those of higher and lower orders.  The lower 
excellences are those which lie outside of dialectical activities, the higher excellences are those 
which can be engaged dialectically.  Further, it is a part of the nature of dialectical activities that 
the intelligibility, importance, and meaning of instantiations of the activity depend on the larger 
activity.  An instrumental jam session is not possible for a person independently of their 
temporally extended activity of playing the instrument.  A first kiss which evolves into a loving, 
lifelong relationship gains the depth of its beauty and meaning from this longer dialectic.  So, 
there is also a distinction between the higher excellence of the extended activity and the higher 
excellence of the fragmentary instance of the activity.  Dialectical activities are not the highest 
excellence though, for they are themselves dependent on the higher excellence of what is 
engaged.  The dialectical activity of a loving relationship with another person depends on the 
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deep value of that person such that an ever more discerning understanding of their value and how 
to best respond to that value are possible.   
 By preliminary example, the fragmentary higher excellence of a gourmet meal71 is not 
really appreciated as excellent unless the extended higher excellence of cooking or savoring have 
been extensively engaged.  The depth of the meal’s value is only discernible within this yet 
deeper good.  This means that any particular excellence, to be really loved as excellent, requires 
extensive engagement with relevantly similar particulars.  It is the possibility of this extended 
engagement which picks out the higher excellences.  A young child could, of course, enjoy an 
excellent meal.  Yet they would hardly enjoy it as excellent, except in a shallow and infirm 
sense.  This is why they would usually prefer chicken nuggets.  The higher temporally extended 
excellences necessarily pick out higher fragmentary excellences, because their temporal 
extension relies on a certain depth in their objects.  So, the standard I suggest picks out the 
higher, temporally extended goods and these in turn pick out higher from lower fragmentary 
goods.   
 The asymmetry here is important, because fried chicken paste does not really allow of the 
dialectical activities of savoring or cooking.  Once one has eaten or microwaved frozen chicken 
nuggts a few times, the depth of their value has run out.  This is how dialectical activities disbar 
base biological drives from contributing to wellbeing or fitting as a motivational ideal.  Those 
goods which are not fit objects of dialectical engagement are the lower excellences which 
persons who do not make an effort to appreciate excellence would not only appreciate, but cling 
to.  In more direct terms from Finite, those who do not love the good would be picked out by 
their lack of dialectical participation with higher-order goods. 
                                                          
71
 Adams (1999), p30. It is an early example of the pervasiveness of Godlikeness. 
53 
 
 The dialectical standard can now be related back to the problem of practical vacuity 
argued in A.IV.1.  When we get advice from friends and family or consult an authority on an 
issue, we seek those with wisdom in the area of our concern.  The dialectical criterion makes 
good sense of this phenomenon, because dialectical engagement produces wisdom or 
understanding.  It rescues Finite from practical vacuity by establishing the superlative sense of 
excellence in relativizing an individual’s predication of excellence to the dialectical wisdom of 
that individual.  A friend’s assertion of a movie’s excellence would be indexed to my knowledge 
of her extensive engagement with the dialectical activity of appreciating movies.  This makes 
sense of why I do not see the same value in a similar assertion from a neophyte and why my 
practical reasoning from each will be different.  An assertion of a lover’s beauty will have this 
same indexing, because it is the extended experience between both which makes sense of the 
expressive potency of the claim.  A person’s internal practical reasoning from judgments of love 
and excellence will have this same mark, because it is only by the temporally extended 
experience with relevantly similar particulars that we can make such a judgment or trust our 
judgments of love or excellence as reliable to our practical reason.  
 It may be objected that lower excellences like chicken nuggets or base biological drives 
can become part of larger dialectical activities.  The biological drive for sex could be part of the 
dialectical activity of intimate sex with one’s spouse or junk food could be made gourmet or 
approached from the scientific perspective of a laboratory nutritionist.  Far from an objection, 
this is just dialectical activities respecting Finite’s expansion of excellence by providing a 
criterion which is largely dependent on personal approach.  Recall that in section A, I highlighted 
Adams’s struggle to define the excellences of natural vitality as open to placement in a 
motivational ideal, while biological drives as such do not fit.  A dialectical criterion parses out 
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this distinction perfectly, because anything we might consider intuitively to be a lower good can 
be made higher.  The turning of base biological drives into important contributors to the well-
lived life or an integrative motivational ideal is merely a matter of dialectical engagement.  Even 
such a typically distrusted biological drive as the human tendency to violence can be made 
excellent in the activities of jujitsu or boxing.  The dialectical criterion vindicates Adams’s 
assertion of the natural excellence of our vitality.72  There is a perspectival aspect to dialectical 
activities which depends on both the possibility of dialectical engagement, and that the activity is 
intrinsically valued.  Thus, it is only those goods approached through dialectical activities which 
are integrative into a motivational ideal and which contribute to wellbeing. 
II.3 Dialectical standard as sufficient condition   
 This perspectival aspect has an epistemic feature which also makes sense of why 
Adams’s standard of ‘enjoyment of excellence' alone was so ripe for repugnant parody.  I 
suggest that excellences must be enjoyed as excellent to contribute to wellbeing or a personal 
ethical scheme.  Moreover, dialectical activities are the only available route to the achievement 
of really seeing an excellence as excellent.  My assertions here turns on the difference between 
an ill-formed hint that a thing is worthy of love and a more fully formed understanding.  A 
person might get a hint of poetry’s beauty in the first poem they read, but the depth of poetry 
does not allow of such quick access to its inner value; the value is only found internally within 
the extended activity of reading poetry.  So, that a good should be made into a higher-order good 
is the burden of understanding a thing as excellent and loving its excellence.  I think this is what 
we would expect, if Adams’s transcendence thesis is correct and the world is diffused with 
Godlikeness.   
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 The recognition of aspects of transcendence would not jump out at children and those 
who lack experience with particulars, for the same reason there are no ethical prodigies.  An 
Augustine or Nygren could not have gained their theistic insights, from which Adams pulls, as 
youths.73  Insights into goodness and thereby into God require comprehensive, dialectical 
engagement with goods.  Adams cites agreement and disagreement with Nygren at several points 
on the nature of God’s love. But neither of them could have a robust notion of love about which 
to argue, without having themselves engaged in lengthy loving relationships.  Their knowledge 
of love, what it means to love someone or something, would not be possible otherwise.  One 
reason transcendence is ill-suited to serve as an ethical standard without a standard of higher 
goods, is because of the dependence of any personal idea of transcendence on developed, higher 
goods.  
 At the same time, a real appreciation of poetry’s excellence will require the absorptive 
appreciation in the activity which just is enjoyment of its excellence.   Under normal conditions, 
knowing the goodness of a thing and enjoying its goodness often appear in tandem.  This is 
Brewer’s Aristotelian standard of pleasure: that full absorption as time seems to flow by is the 
phenomenological marker of engagement with a vivid awareness of value.74   The achievement 
of knowledge of the good is not limited to elitist goods like poetry, but all goods.  The mindless 
consumption of junk culture and junk food does not fit the standard of wellbeing or an 
integrative motivational ideal, because mindless consumption only fits the illusion of enjoyment.  
This is not Millian deck-stacking against lower pleasures, but a denial that those ‘pleasures’ fit 
any real standard of enjoyment at all.75  There is no vivid awareness of value or wanting nothing 
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more than to continue the doing.  It turns out that Brewer’s theory of dialectical interaction 
vindicates Adams’s own effort to limit his motivational ideal of love for the good by love as 
enjoyment.76  What Finite required was a standard of the achievement of understanding goodness 
which stresses a more active, not passive, experience with goods and the attendant pleasure in 
excellence.         
 In stressing the epistemic and pleasurable aspect of dialectical activities, I am closing in 
on my claim of Brewer’s theory of dialectical activities as sufficient for ethical ordering and 
wellbeing.  Not only are dialectical activities sufficient for knowledge and enjoyment of what is 
worthy of love, I suggest that they are also sufficient for a proper ordering of value and for 
wellbeing.  In this, the further insight is gained that living well and doing well are not properly 
separable.  Retrieval’s theory of dialectical activities will need to be more fully developed to 
demonstrate this sufficiency.  Two closely related aspects will show this point: the burden of 
autonomy and the role of character friendships. Before setting into their elucidation, it should be 
noted that all dialectical activities require “propitious conditions” in opportunities, personal 
ability, etc., so the need for a certain degree of luck is built-in.77  
 First, the theory of dialectical engagement is constrained by a distinctly moral conception 
of autonomy and the achievement of self-directed activities. For a person to engage in a 
dialectical activity, he must at least approximate a fully-formed self who reasons coherently from 
a sense of non-dualistic goodness.  Without the necessary coherence, the person dissolves into a 
disordered multiplicity that can only be superficially regarded as a self, because it lacks the 
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inner-agreement necessary for autonomous self-direction.78  Second, this coherence is not 
possible for humans in isolation from one another, but can only be achieved through character 
friendships.  Without character friendships, a person would be adrift in their efforts to achieve 
the coherent evaluative outlook required for self-direction.  Engagement in the dialectic of a 
loving relationship is not just a prime example of dialectical activity; it is a necessary activity for 
the autonomy which is required for real engagement in any activity.   
 This rough sketch of the fully-formed theory of the dialectical criterion shows its 
sufficiency for wellbeing and an ethical motivational ideal by its standard of values which 
demands relational ordering and the development of the achievement of love.  By the burden of 
autonomy, it raises the stakes for the development of an integrative motivational ideal such that a 
rough fitting of this proper relation carries more weight.  Adams allows that the consequence of a 
person’s not possessing an ordered scheme of values hates an aspect of themselves in an internal 
war of motivations.79  This turns out to be underselling integration by love for the good, because 
what is at stake is the formation of the self and the capacity for love at all.   
 The importance of a developed capacity for love is carried further by the importance of 
character friendship.  Part of the ideal of character friendship is coming to an intersubjectively 
self-affirmable evaluative outlook which is indicative of autonomous coherence.  Through 
mutual love and admiration with a character friend, we come by dialectical engagement to hold 
an evaluative outlook which is completely affirmed as intersubjectively coherent in the eyes of 
another.80  The mutual love between such ideal friends brings them into closer evaluative 
coherence with one another as each struggles to possess the virtue which will make them worthy 
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of the other’s love.  By this process, the achievement of autonomy and an outlook which 
approaches affirmability across all relevant social perspectives, arrive simultaneously.  In a deep 
way, the capacity for subsidiary loves is parasitic on this primary love.  The ethical burden of 
such a character friendship is great, but by its integrative ordering of value and generation of the 
capacity to love, its practical and epistemic criterion of excellence is thus a sufficient condition 
for Finite’s motivational ideal and wellbeing.   
 Yet wouldn’t such a finite standard of excellence involve the flaw of idolatry by its 
misidentification of human love as the highest ethical ideal?  Not at all, if character friendship is 
incorporated as the best route to love for the good.  In the first place, the mutual pruning of 
evaluative outlooks could partly go by way of the critical stance which Adams sees as a vital 
ethical mechanism.81  Indeed, such a mechanism of criticality could be part of character friends’ 
view to self-affirmability, such that they never fully achieve an outlook they feel comfortable 
regarding with fully intersubjective or universal self-affirmation.  All the dialectical criterion 
requires is the supplementary constraint that their evaluations of self-affirmability should 
consider God’s perspective as the most important relevant social perspective.  Second, the 
dialectical standard does not generate idolatry because the achieved understanding of love, as 
stated above, is necessary for an achieved ideal of God’s love.  So, the love between the ideal 
character friends would not eclipse God, but make possible a deep love for the transcendent 
Good.  It seems like this is supported by wide religious emphasis on the sacrament of marriage, 
though of course romantic love is not the only form of character friendship. 
 The dialectical criterion seems to work hand in glove with Finite.  It provides both 
necessary and sufficient conditions for its ethical theory and prevents practical vacuity.  There 
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may be a worry that it offends against Finite’s concern for egalitarianism.  Dialectical activities 
do require some luck of circumstance and ability, might be taken to be inaccessible to most 
people, and may offend against Finite’s view of the value of persons as persons.  The 
requirement of luck and ability is not, though, overly burdensome, just that a person needs a 
passable upbringing and the good fortune not to be blighted in life.  Adams has already brought a 
fair amount of luck into the equation of wellbeing by the condition of enjoyment and any ethical 
theory will require that an ethical valuing only be possible for an ethical person.   Also, 
dialectical activities are distinct and important, but ultimately attainable to most people in most 
circumstances if they cultivate a suitable disposition.  Friendship and parenting are not goods of 
the economically elite.  Last, the dialectical criterion does not offend against the value of persons 
as persons, because the ontological status of the sacred and what is good for the sacred could 
hardly be said to conflict.        
III. Thin transcendence in Retrieval 
 With the argument for dialectical excellence in Finite out of the way, the remainder of 
this section is devoted to the Retrieval side of the synthetic project.  Whereas the theory of 
dialectical activities seemed almost ready-made to work as Finite’s criterion of excellence, the 
effort to read transcendence into Retrieval will be more of a process.  The first step in the process 
is to show that a thin version of transcendence is already at work in Retrieval and that a thicker 
version transcendence, like Adams’s, would eliminate the problem of subjectivism.   
III.1 Retrieval’s employment of thin transcendence 
 I hold that Retrieval’s deployment of value already possesses the characteristics of 
transcendence, but without the metaphysical thickness of Finite’s transcendence thesis.  That 
60 
 
Retrieval relies on an implicit theory of transcendence is shown in three points: (1) goodness 
transcends human understanding, (2) value permeates the world of experience, but is not 
projected or constructed, and (3) there is a highest good by which subordinate goods are ordered 
and understood.  As these three features are listed, they represent more to less interpretive 
aspects of the good in Retrieval.  I will now work through them piecemeal in demonstration of 
their accuracy. 
 First, the role of the good in Retrieval transcends our understanding because it is 
ineffable and beyond reduction.  The good is real and external, but its source and nature is 
mysterious.  We reason from goods as if they are objective and external, but their nature 
precludes reduction or precision.  The intrinsic values which guide our thoughts and actions 
cannot be reduced to natural properties or propositionally reduced at all.   Even when we come 
close to understanding the particular goodness of a good engaged in dialectical activity, the 
goodness defies any personal completion.  It is the nature of dialectical activities that the good 
which you inchoately intimate and which drives you to “throw yourself” into them recedes as 
your understanding progresses.82  Desires for goods engaged dialectically are fugitive in content 
and grasp, because dialectics do not allow of perfection.  Persons or philosophy or music cannot 
be grasped completely or with finality, because their depth makes the assertion of such 
attainment an empty boast.  Indeed, it would be a hollow claim indicative of the claimer’s 
obvious lack of the stated attainment.  A claim to understand philosophy in its entirety would be 
nearly unintelligible— intrinsic goods are not that kind of thing. 
 Second, though the first-personal evaluative outlook on the good is guided by the 
subjective personal experiences which sculpt that outlook, value cannot be anything like a 
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projection or Kantian-style category of goodness.  It must be externally real by demand of 
practical primacy.  It is a recurrently important step in Retrieval’s arguments to denounce 
constructivist or internalist theories of practical reason and value.  Yet, the example of the 
distinctness of the practical contours of experience on B-15 would, on its face, suggest precisely 
this conclusion.  This is another part of the importance of the analogy with transcendental 
idealism given in section B, where it may have appeared strained or superfluous: practical 
idealism cannot utilize anything like the discursivity of transcendental idealism.  Though the 
practical dimension of any experience is shaped by the distinctness of the experiencing 
perspective, the values distinct perspectives track must non-naturally permeate the world of 
experience.  Evaluative outlooks are not projections, but carvings from an inexhaustible world of 
value.  
 Third, the good is not only transcendent and immanent in the world, but also hierarchical.  
This last point falls on Brewer’s grounding value claims in a theory of the good human life.  The 
theory of dialectics which structure our lives and experience by their place in the process of 
coming to see and live by the good, is itself grounded in common features of the good human 
life.  An essential part of what it means to understand the value of an activity is to properly value 
its place relative to other values in a “full and flourishing human life.”  An understanding of an 
activity’s value is not a separable, surd quality which might be fully achieved in isolation from 
any other considerations, because a person who pursues a value when it is inappropriate shows 
himself to misunderstand that value.83  Given my limited resources and capacities, an important 
feature of my life is figuring out when an action would be ill-suited, particularly for living a good 
life.  Part of what figuring out what a good life will mean for me is finding which actions are 
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conducive to it.  Brewer thinks it is only through experience with a diverse array of dialectics 
that I can ever achieve this needed perspective.  So, the proper ordering of intrinsically valuable 
activities against one another and against instrumental values, is the “master activity of making 
use of our capacity for practical thinking in the unshirkable task of leading a life.”84   
 The ideal ordering, plus luck, is the eudaimon life of unimpeded, pleasurable activity in 
accordance with virtue.  But eudaimonia cannot be the highest good in light of which the master 
task of ordering the pursuit of lesser values is guided, because the proper ordering just is 
eudaimonia.  To hold eudaimonia as both the proper ordering and the good which guides the 
proper ordering would create incoherence with Brewer’s larger theory.  Since the highest good 
would then be the internal organization of lesser goods guiding itself, this would generate 
internalism about the highest good which flatly contradicts Brewer’s realism.  Further, given the 
plurality of flourishing lives, there must be some shared highest good which informs their 
distinct eudaimon dialectic.  I conclude that the hierarchical picture of lesser transcendent goods 
intimately related to a highest transcendent good is thus a crucial element of Brewer’s theory. 
III.2 Transcendental good as thickly transcendent good 
 It seems to me that the best way to understand these three features of the good is that 
Brewer already implicitly uses a thin version of the transcendence thesis which, in its thicker 
form, explicitly guides Adams.  Since Retrieval’s use of the good already possesses the features 
of transcendent, ineffable values which permeate reality and are closely related to a highest good, 
the good is thinly transcendent. The thick transcendence thesis in Finite is of goods as unified 
around and parasitic on an infinite and transcendent good which is the exemplar of intrinsic 
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value.  The transcendent Good provides a robust unification of goods and an ideal of love for the 
transcendent Good as a common motivational ideal.  Pertinent to present concerns, the 
sharedness of this metaphysical source of value also secures objectivity among perspectives on 
value judgments.  In a way, tracking and appreciating transcendence is the shared task of all 
persons. 
 I suggest that the thinness of Brewer’s theory of transcendent value is causing the illness 
of subjectivism and that thicker transcendence is its cure.  His value realism already relies on a 
thin conception of transcendent goodness.  A thicker definition would provide the objective 
sharedness required for the practical perspective.  At least two paths lie open in the task of 
employing thick transcendence to ground objectivity between practical reasoners.  One would be 
a direct application of Finite’s theistic metaphysics of value.  Interesting avenues of support lay 
open here.  Adams offers a brief cosmological argument for transcendence that the beauty of a 
truth should be taken for the cause of its truth.  I think what I have interpreted as the ‘principle of 
practical primacy’ could very well support such an appeal to beauty as a truth-maker for the 
adoption of a theistic metaphysics.   
 However, this metaphysical route also conflicts with Retrieval’s method of ontological 
avoidance, as I noted on B-17.  Brewer clarifies his realism: “The task of practical thinking is not 
to ascertain the mere existence of entities that happen to be normative.  The task is to come to an 
understanding of how best to live and to live in the light of that understanding.”85  To cater to the 
practical perspective, I suggested in the previous section that the objectivizing source needed for 
practical idealism, its transcendental good, be conceived along purely epistemic lines.  The 
second path in employment of Adams’s transcendence thesis, the one I propose, is to re-ground 
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transcendence along these practically epistemic constraints.  This can be done by reconceiving 
the transcendent Good as an exemplar of evaluative outlook, rather than an exemplar of all value.  
It will be the perspective of the transcendent Good as an intentional being, which will be primary 
in the transformed account.  The face I will argue this transformation should take is that of a 
normative definition of community.   
IV. Community as Transcendent and Transcendental Good 
There is an objective and subjective perspective on the sense of community I have in 
mind.  The subjective perspective is the place of community in practical reasoning.  The 
objective looks to what the community must be like to fit thick transcendence.  This subsection 
provides a rough sketch of what a community must look like to fit Adams’s constraints and 
Brewer’s needs in establishing the needed synthesis by transcendence.  I begin with 
considerations specifically related to the prevention of subjectivism in practical idealism.  These 
are Retrieval’s requirements of the community in eunoia for character friendships and the 
screening of thick evaluative concepts.  I then move to a sketch of the ideal of community which 
is to reground Adams’s transcendent Good and thereby act as the transcendental object of 
Brewer’s practical idealism.   These are intentionality arising from evaluative coherence and 
transcendent judgment arising from collective efforts at evaluative clarity  
IV.1 Retrieval’s need for transcendent community as transcendental good 
 There were a few features of Retrieval which needed the transcendental good and 
suggested its social grounding.  The first is that practical idealism seems to occlude truly shared 
experiences, meaningful communication, and character friendship between two people with a 
disparate evaluative outlook generated by their distinct practical experiences, yet, importantly, 
65 
 
who share a common culture and live decidedly eudaimonistic lives.  A shared source of the 
good between these two opens up at least the possibility of shared views and communication on 
important shared social or political issues and perhaps even the possibility of character 
friendship.  The second is a specific aspect of the first issue that practical idealism dooms an 
individual’s efforts to sort the thick evaluative concepts by which they interpret and interact with 
the world to a stilted and subjective standard.  Because practical idealism prevents the possibility 
of truly, dialectically meaningful communication, much less friendship, between disparate but 
equally excellent lifestyles, one’s possible character friends will necessarily possess serious 
limitations on the differences of their evaluative outlook from one’s own.  Yet inter-social 
dialogue is essential to the achievement of a nuanced evaluative ordering which might offer the 
sort of objective outlook on the world of value which establishes autonomy and allows full 
involvement in character friendship.   
 So, interestingly, Brewer is right in holding that autonomy and character friendships 
possess a decidedly moral content that makes one’s achievement of both in tandem an ideal 
which is composssible for all, but wrong that this compossibility is accessible for atomistic 
character friends.  Considerations of character friendship’s political and cultural setting are as 
important to the self’s possibility of autonomy or character friendship, because for the sort of 
unbiased value-tracking outlook which makes possible true virtue, and the same of true 
autonomy and friendship, a society must be either extremely homogenous or more socially 
dynamic in its pluralism than Brewer allows.     
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IV.2 The community’s burden of eunoia and evaluative conceptual coherence 
The sense of community I look to employ is of groups of people who loosely share an 
evaluative understanding displayed by their shared set of values, particularly thick evaluative 
concepts.  Communities are comprised of subcommunities which have characteristics close to 
the community which they comprise, but in their focus lack the completeness offered by the 
transcendent community.  Particular regional communities like cities and more dispersed 
communities like scientific, artistic, or ethnic communities are the sort of subcommunities I 
mean.  Whether it is a maximal, global community or the political community of a modern 
nation or a particular city, the scope of what is a community or subcommunity will depend 
entirely on the needs of the practical perspective.  The only real limitation on scope, for reasons 
apparent below, is that the community should itself be comprised of a diverse range of 
subcommunities.   
 This grounding in community must provide the background conditions such that the 
eunoia necessary for character friendship is a broad social possibility.  Brewer states that eunoia 
is the foundational affection from which character friendship springs and is therefore necessary 
for its possibility between two people.86  For the shared evaluative understanding which must be 
derived from a network of character friendship (both for the sake of individual and communal 
correctness of evaluation) to be achieved, a widespread and mutual eunoia among citizens must 
be present.  This may seem to generate the threat of a vicious circle, because the sense of 
community which just is general social eunoia is necessary for the establishment of such a 
community as might generate such eunoia.  Yet, I think that this just is Brewer’s assertion that 
those who have never had a sense of human value could not be instructed by argument as to its 
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worth87, applied to the community scale in eunoia.  By parity of reasoning, while eunoia will be 
brutely necessary to begin the process of community formation, the theory of community 
presented here will need to involve eunoia in holding it together. 
 In section B, I argued that Brewer’s position on thick evaluative concepts and its 
mechanism for providing objectivity were flawed because his test of socio-historical 
decomposition could be misapplied and because it does not capture the larger social process as it 
occurs.  The standard I suggest to supplement Retrieval’s method is the transcendently good 
community’s considered evaluative outlook when it incorporates, by the efforts of its 
subcommunities, the sorting of evaluative concepts by its members in a coherent set.   
 On the ground, when the testing of thick evaluative concepts against each other goes 
well, it already takes this form.  If I find a faulty evaluative concept maligns me unfairly, I am 
likely to discuss it with others like me to discern whether they feel the same.  Often, though not 
always, I will be communicating with a subcommunity and will hope to push, as a 
subcommunity, for the broader community to renounce the concept.  If I am earnest in my 
sorting of evaluative concepts for faulty concepts which do not affect me, I will require both the 
testament of those persons whom they do affect expressed as the considered conviction of their 
subcommunity and the larger community’s position on this view.  If I am at pains to mine my 
positive thick evaluative concepts for those which deserve special prominence or for new 
evaluative concepts which track new goods and virtues, then I will often rely on communaly 
shared views of exemplars of those concepts.  By way of my character friends, I will both 
express and encourage my outlook on evaluative concepts and gain from their own considered 
views. 
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This, anyway, is more or less how I think we have arrived at the current ‘politically 
correct’ general set of shared evaluative concepts.  It is the social process of a pluralistic society 
at work in what might meaningfully be called its own edification.  Often the process has yielded 
massive conceptual improvement, though quite commonly false value concepts weasel in and 
true value concepts fall out of favor.  Yet always the assortment and ordering which is to 
represent my distinct and unique outlook falls in the final view on me.  Since by practical 
idealism’s lights these very concepts will order my experience and activity in the world and 
constitute with whom I am character friends, my personal set is, in a significant sense, who I am.  
Practical primacy is represented in this process by the virtues’ constitution of the autonomous 
self88, the undelegability of moral thinking89, and the necessity of character friends.   
So far I have stressed social relations, the historical community, and communication 
between sub-communities, but Retrieval itself makes reference to socially inherited doxastic 
beliefs90 and the sorting process of socio-historical indexing and decomposition mentioned 
above.  Thick transcendence enters the picture in a degree of dynamism between the larger 
community and the communities which comprise it.  This is possible if the larger community 
strives for its telos manifest in a disposition of being ‘for the good’ of its members.  At the same 
time, this sorting will just be the community’s striving for the inner coherence which is 
constitutive of its agency and of its ideal as a community.  By sorting through thick evaluative 
concepts, the community shows itself to be for the good of each member within it by impressing 
good-tracking evaluative concepts onto their evaluative sensibilities.  A true community gives 
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individuals the conceptual resources to achieve the virtues necessary for their autonomy and the 
growth of character friendship which is in turn necessary for the community’s existence.   
IV.3 Requirements of Transcendence in the Community  
What the community needs to do, as evaluative exemplar, is support a shared structure of 
practical reason among its members.  The community will be approached from both a top-down 
and bottom-up perspectives, with the top-down perspective explored first.  The bottom-up 
perspective, elaborated in the next subsection, will be the role of community in the first-personal 
view of practical reason.  The top-down perspective will be the wider view of transcendent 
characteristics the community must possess to fill its role.  I will take up this wider perspective 
first, making some assumptions on these details of the community, and look to justify these 
assumptions later.  
The community must possess an evaluative outlook that structures distinct and distant 
practical perspectives to meet the role of securing objectivity among practical reasoners.  For 
simplicity, I will use Brewer’s example of different perspectives on the same buzzsaw referenced 
in the previous section to demonstrate this point.  It should be kept in mind that the ethical stakes 
are higher than this suggests, because the practical perspectives they represent are structural 
features of important types of lives and outlooks on value.  The sound artist, mechanic, and 
carpenter, though they cannot directly affirm each other’s outlooks on value, must each find 
affirmation from the larger perspective of the community they comprise.  The way I see this 
working is that the subcommunities of likeminded individuals of which they are a part, of artists 
or mechanics or carpenters, must affirm the practical structure which informs these individual 
practical perspectives.  Whereas the practical contours of the carpenter and artist may not allow 
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of effective communication or understanding between the two, fellow artists and carpenters 
would not possess this same limitation.  Their experiences will be comparatively very close; they 
could more naturally become character friends.  The issue which the community must alleviate is 
bridging this gap between subcommunities, rather than the individuals themselves.  While each 
practical perspective will be distinct, the problem of subjectivism would not arise if a large 
homogeny of practical structure obtained between individuals.   
In the case of a pluralistic (broadly define) society, the community must play a role of 
containing these subcommunities in a way that their perspectives are unified in its perspective.  
To fill this role, the community must have an evaluative outlook which is comprised of the 
diverse range of the practical perspectives of its members.   So, the community, to fit the 
characteristics of transcendence, must be importantly like a person such that it might reasonably 
be ascribed an evaluative outlook and this evaluative outlook must contain the conceptual 
resources of its subcommunities.  To speak loosely, this evaluative outlook will hang on the 
shared thick evaluative concepts on offer to its members such that they can form a unified 
network of character friendships.  By unified, I do not mean that any astronaut or farmer needs to 
be capable of character friendship.  Rather, it is only that their subcommunities possess ties 
through character friendships with each other.  The burden of the network of character 
friendships appears twofold at this juncture.  First, divergent outlooks on value between 
members of the same community should not preclude character friendship between two persons 
living excellent lives.  Such a coherent network of character friendships would also depend on 
both widespread and shared eunoia among members for members qua members and a shared 
stock of thick evaluative concepts, including the virtues and vices.  Otherwise, the problem of 
subjectivism, argued in the previous section, in atomistic character friendships and the sorting of 
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thick evaluative concepts arises.  Second, subcommunities which offer specialized evaluative 
concepts that do occlude ties in its network of friendship should be actively discouraged by the 
larger community.   
The idealized set of coherently shared evaluative understandings among this network of 
character friendships would be the community’s evaluative outlook.  Brewer’s account of 
autonomy (coherence in reasoning on the good) mapped on to the community can be employed 
to render the needed degree of coherence for intentionality.   This coherent evaluative outlook 
secures the community’s agency and intentionality by the unity among subcommunities it makes 
possible through the fairness of its thick evaluative concepts.  Intentionality is important for a 
transcendent Good because it must be ‘for the good’ of its members by willing that they possess 
direction towards the good in their received evaluative concepts.  It also must be capable of 
relationship with each of its members by their relationship with one another proceeding by way 
of its outlook expressed in their evaluative concepts.  The coherence of evaluative outlook is 
made possible by unity of membership and the collective judgments of members in arriving at a 
shared set of evaluative concepts. 
Further, it must judge excellence as excellent for its members.  Community support for 
excellence backs up practical idealism by its being the ideal judge of value in conjunction with 
its judgments being for the good of its members.  This feature helps establish the maximal 
intersubjectivity which secures the objectivity of distinct outlooks on practical reason, because 
the community’s larger perspective can recognize the values of the subcommunities.  The 
community’s place as an ideal judger of excellence is taken from the collective efforts of the 
network of character friends to arrive at tenable, good-tracking sets of thick evaluative concepts.  
In a sense, this just will be the eunoia of the community’s members striving for fair and just 
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evaluative outlooks which do not unfairly disadvantage any subcommunity that supports .  
Because the effort is collective, judgments of excellence at the community level will possess a 
degree of nuance and objectivity which no individual could ever possess.  Its outlook and 
judgments on value are transcendent.  Because the community is external and evaluatively 
hegemonic, it prevents practical subjectivity by grounding our individual judgments of practical 
reasons in a community of practical reasoners conceived as a practically reasoning community.     
In Finite’s terms, the community so constituted can ground the needed relational ordering 
among goods by its degree of transcendent value such that any good can be understood as 
relational to aspects of the community.  Translated to Retrieval’s needs, this value and its 
ordering relation establish the shared practical outlook on the good which secures practical 
idealism.  Security in the practical is bound to intersubjectivity and the rectifications of 
conceptual sorting and the possibility of diverse character friendships.  Coherence of evaluative 
outlook, unity among members, and the collective sorting of evaluative concepts are all 
necessary for one another.  Their reciprocity is reflected in their mutual support for the 
community’s intentionality of being ‘for the good’ and its status as an ideal judge of excellences. 
This mutuality has interesting connections with both Retrieval and Finite because the 
community’s transcendent perspective depends on a completion of its virtues in which no aspect 
could be possessed without the others.  This connects with Adams’s insistence that the 
transcendent Good, as the metaphysical ground of value, possess and actualize a completeness of 
excellence which no person could ever achieve.91  It connects with Brewer’s Aristotelian 
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intuition that the virtues are “unified in the sense that it is impossible to have one virtue in the 
fullest degree if one lacks any other.”92 
V. The place of the transcendent community from the practical perspective 
 Given the place of thick evaluative concepts in particularized ethical navigation, there is a 
strong connection between ethics and community. In this subsection, I argue a more specific role 
for the community in Retrieval in morality by way of synthesis with Finite’s theory of morality. I 
begin the task of this subsection with a social theory of the right from the perspective of the 
practical reasoner.  I then endeavor to incorporate Adams’s divine command theory, suitably 
transformed, into this larger perspective.  I end by placing a community-affirmability restriction 
on the right.  
V.1 A Social Theory of the Right and the Practical Perspective          
To begin I need to square the distinctness considerations of the right with the theory’s 
commitment to monistic goodness in which moral value is not a realm of value distinct from 
non-moral value.  In addition, the transcendental good must be incorporated.  My solution is an 
account of shifting self/other valences in discernment of goods and the community’s evaluative 
outlook.   A valence shifting treatment of the derived from Brewer’s arguments against goodness 
dualism can offer a suitable basis for distinguishing between practical considerations of good and 
right.  Good actions involving others have a primacy of relation to self, while right actions have a 
primacy of relation to other.  In both there is a self-other relation in our practical considerations, 
but by putting more weight on one or the other, we can incorporate a distinction between the 
right and the good which does not offend against monism.  An explanation of this point will 
require a social theory that provides a more subtle cutting between the distinctness of persons.  
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 In acting from considerations of what is right or what is owed, we deliberate from a 
perspective which shrinks the gulf of distinctness between persons.  We are inescapably 
constrained by our first personal perspective and self-directed action depends on reasoning from 
our relation to goodness.  Yet we can stretch our understanding to consider reasons from a wider 
perspective in communities which encompasses a richer, more objective outlook than our own.  
In the limiting case, it is a community of two.  This allows us to override our own proto-
evaluative seemings of goodness (desires, emotions, pleasures) to recognize what it would be 
good to do despite our having no desire to do it.  Brewer describes this doing what we have no 
desire to do as accomplished through strained concentration.  My suggestion is that, at least in 
the case of right action, it is a strained concentration to consider things from an evaluative 
perspective which is not an impersonal fiction, but a collective and agential outlook.  
 The view on offer avoids offending goodness monism by a subjectivism of the right.  
When we reason practically from considerations of right, we are not considering a special and 
overriding realm of value.  Rather, we are stretching our evaluative outlook so as to reason from 
an evaluative perspective which is almost always more trustworthy and socially judicious.  Such 
stretching is an instance of reason correcting desire, for we can hope that through habituation we 
will come to see the right as good.  What is now considered right will then become incorporated 
into our evaluative outlook as good and desiring what is now right will be conferred.  Though 
sometimes doing what is right should never come to be felt as good, one can hope that it was 
good from the larger social perspective. 
 My view here is illustrated in Brewer’s example of cleaning a communal bathroom as a 
paradigmatic case of forcing myself to do what I have no desire to do.  Take it that I would 
ideally be acting from virtue out of a sense of obligation and not, for example, pragmatism.  I 
75 
 
might be fulfilling this obligation because I value my relations with the other toilet users, but I 
may not be on good terms with them and still value the community.  I would recognize, by 
stretching my understanding, the value of the group’s evaluative outlook and its propriety in 
sorting my personal good such that it aligns with the group good.  I would then have reasoned 
from the right to discern the good. 
On the present theory, the right as an efficacious distinction will depend upon an 
evaluative outlook which is only ever partially realized in fragmentary considerations, but 
always present.  At the highest level of abstraction it will be the transcendent outlook of the 
transcendent good— the community which contains all subcommunities.  This is the perspectival 
aspect of the transcendental good securing morality at the practical level in the same way it 
secures objectivity at the metaphysical or metaepistemological level.  The adjudication between 
how high considerations of communal perspective must go and the scope of such considerations 
will be situationally dependent.  Usually the task will take its most concrete form and fall on a 
shared perspective between a self and an other.  When this shared perspective is absent or claims 
of requirement are faulty, a perspective which is shared might be found in a wider scope. 
 My synthesized theory allows a weak cultural relativity while denying a strong relativity.  
It allows a weak cultural relativism for the good because such goods as dialectical activities, the 
structure of character friends’ interactions, the possibility and structure of symbolic value, and 
thick evaluative concepts are indexed to the practical reasoner’s background culture.  In the 
present case of the right, it is that the evaluative outlook of the community which we stretch to 
appreciate when we do not naturally understand the good from its perspective, is indexed to the 
actual community’s idealized perspective which we are employing.  If we care to take the time 
we can consider the larger communities in which the community we are considering nests and at 
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the level of highest abstraction the maximal community in which all of our community 
memberships arise.  Such stretch of evaluative understanding will be difficult, narrow and likely 
impossible for any one person and so must usually be undertaken as a group at the 
subcommunity level.  This is part of the importance of social leveraging in the sorting of thick 
evaluative concepts.  It denies a strong cultural relativism because such considerations will still 
be checked at the individual level against standards of coherence and consistency to prevent an 
idolatry associated with a lack of critical stance.   
Considerations of rightness, then, are an important part of the phenomenological 
evidence for the practical equivalent of the transcendental good.  They represent a fragmentary 
glimpse of a value which we can never understand in immediacy, but which practical reason 
rests upon in insistence of its existence.     
V.2 Initial problems for the practical theory of the right 
 The practical theory of the right depends on an evaluative parasitism which may suggest 
certain unsavory consequences.  The most problematic would be that a theory which indexes 
outlooks on value to a transcendent community generates conflicts with practical primacy’s 
rejection of reductionism.  At the practical level, the value of persons is felt to be brute and 
mysterious, but that the capacity for recognizing and acting from value should be so parasitic can 
(1) seem to devalue autonomy and (2) suggest that our loves and actions must always be 
rubberstamped by the community’s affirmation. 
The first worry is easily dealt with by noting that the community’s evaluative outlook is a 
product of individuals’ and that groups of practical reasoners develop nuanced and particularized 
distinctions which no individual could achieve.  The evaluative insight of a group of people, 
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particularly at the community level, is simply degrees of magnitude more perspicacious than an 
individuals’.  It transcends any effort of individual discernment.  In particular along the lines of 
sorting thick evaluative concepts discussed above.  What is more, the modern antagonistic 
paradigm of individual-versus-community disapates with the fall of the personal/impersonal 
goodness division.  It turns on an utter misconception of the nature of value and autonomy and 
on an unhealthy modern obsession with individuality.   
 The second worry, that we would lose the intimate relation between our loves and actions 
and ourselves by indexing them to the community’s perspective, can be dispelled by allowance 
of two points.  One is that the community’s perspective is generally valid in that its considered 
standards can show when our loves are unhealthy or deeply problematic (as in a one-sided or 
abusive relationship or an obsessive activity).  The other is that love’s particularity indicates that 
it is only the community’s received standards of what love is and how to love that our personal 
loves are dependent on from the practical perspective.   
 This brings up an important question of how we are to interact with communities such 
that transcendence can be communally grounded.  By conceiving of the community which is 
reasonably flourishing as a network of character friendship, our actual character friends become 
conduits of interaction with the community and thereby its achieved evaluative outlook.  Given 
the transcendent status of the community, it would be a classic category mistake to say, “I talked 
with my neighbor and spouse and senator, but I never talked with the community”.   When we 
discuss and publicly deliberate through action and speech on values and the way the world is and 
bring our evaluative perspective into greater social atunement, we just are interacting with a 
community.  In the ideal for our self and others, this will be the shared political community. 
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V.3 Finishing the synthesis with Adams’s moral theory 
 I can now bring considerations back to Adams by the place of the right and moral 
obligations.  Finite’s moral theory can be placed within the evaluative outlook theory of monistic 
goodness and the practical account of the right which I have offered so far, by adopting his 
semantic description of obligation, guilt, and blame as a phenomenological taxonomy.  Finite’s 
practical realignment can thereby allow that those with whom we are socially related are the 
foundation of obligations and that the objectivity and imperatival form of obligations is grounded 
in our relationship with the transcendent community. On this synthesized view the 
phenomenological markers of guilt and blame are strong indicators of the right in their capacity 
to push our deliberations into a valence-shifted perspective.  Such emotional content is important 
input for our practical perspective.  We reason from these inputs to deliberation and actions from 
the attitudes which they generate. 
 Finite’s moral theory is pulled deeper still by the muddled nature of the obligatory/ 
supererogatory distinction.  It is so muddled because the difference between obligatory and 
supererogatory actions is typically lost on the virtuous; it is only in struggles to discern and meet 
her obligations that such a distinction comes to light.  It is the phenomenological markers of this 
evaluative struggle, when the right and the good do not seem to line up, that provides the impetus 
for this valence shift.  My assertion is that when judging what others ask of us by this shift we do 
more than ‘put ourselves in their shoes’.  Counter to Adams’s position that obligations must arise 
from actual requests, we attempt to judge obligations from what relations could or should ask of 
us by creatively imagining our shared perspective.  The first-personal perspective only allows us 
to creatively imagine their perspective through our own, but even if we could accomplish the 
task of ‘unselfing’ we would still be regarding a perspective which, if it is worthy of obligation, 
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considers our own.  It would be a perspective which reciprocally seeks to share an evaluative 
outlook with our own in this situation common to each in the relation.  In Retrieval’s terms, it 
would need to at least approximate the character friends’ shared process of reflective evaluative 
equilibrium, otherwise disagreement on the existence and content of obligation will be insoluble.  
On the synthesized view, this is the transcendent community actively seeking to incorporate our 
perspective in its own by way of its thick evaluative outlook.  
The takeaway here is that shame, guilt, and blame do not explicitly enter our 
considerations until we are engaged in the sort of valence-shifting struggle to deepen our grasp 
of the situation.  When we do so struggle, we are likely to consider the other’s view of the 
relationship and our view in tandem with our perspective taken together as a shared, proto-
communal perspective.  When this perspective fails our needs, we find recourse in a broader 
community’s perspective.  We might solicit our friends and family for advice, imaginatively 
consider the external perspective of a real or fictional exemplar or dwell on a parable or 
colloquial rule of thumb.  By our efforts to ‘get outside ourselves’ in all of these cases we are 
tapping into a collective perspective which transcends our own limited experience to bring to 
bear an outlook which establishes practical objectivity through its transcendent judgment and 
grounded sharedness with others.  Adams’s divine command theory, suitably transformed, begins 
to find a place here.  If our considerations fall on broadly accepted and roughly firm social 
principles, whether negative or positive, then we will have followed something closer to explicit 
commands from the community of which we are a part.    
The moral treatment on offer corresponds with both Brewer’s commitment to a reverse-
Hegelian history of philosophical progress and criticism of opposing views as expressive of 
cultural calamity.  By rejection of the utter separability of individual and community, I hope to 
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extend the monistic view of the good which Brewer offers by way of recognition that the selves 
which are the other half of the self/other collapse in goodness are an essential aspect of thought 
as conceptually important distinctions in practical reason.  Indeed, this just is recognition that 
Brewer’s views of “actualizing the self”, unselfing in loving desires, rejection of dualistic good, 
and primacy of the practical perspective are ill at ease together, because considerations of 
self/other are essential to the practical perspective.   
Everyone checks their selfishness by consideration of others in their moral reasoning and 
if the conceptual distinction is efficacious then its reality is unquestionable by Brewer’s own 
position.  So, when there is a rejection of personal/impersonal divide in goodness, it cannot be a 
total rejection of the conceptual efficacy of the divide because it is an important aspect of 
practical reason.  On the one hand, as much as monism is essential to autonomy, reasoning from 
the self and other as distinct is also obviously necessary.  Actualization of one’s good is not just 
a mere byproduct of the first-personal perspective.  It is one’s only perspective on the monistic 
good and, as such, recognition of the self/other distinction in goods is as essential to the sort of 
unique and good human life which displays autonomy as monistic reasoning.  On the other, 
reasoning from the good as monistic does not arise spontaneously, but requires shaping by the 
evaluative concepts of altruism and selfishness.  
To suggest that all persons strive for an ethical ideal which produces evaluative 
compossibility is to suggest a bland and stilted ethical ideal which is ill-suited to the practical 
perspective and the uniqueness of persons’ lives.  My assertion is that by placing this conception 
of morality and evaluative coherence arising out of character friendships in the broader habitat of 
a transcendently excellent community, the substantive shortcomings of Brewer’s position are 
alleviated and without damage or distortion to Retrieval’s ethical theory as it stands.  Indexing 
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atomistic character friendships to the molecules of subcommunities that make up the composite 
community gives character friendships a constitutive ideal which limits the faults to which they 
are prone.  If an evaluative outlook cannot be affirmed from the community perspective when 
that community meets the threshold of its ideal, then that character is deficient regardless of its 
coherence.  Further, the relationship which produced it does not meet the communal-
affirmability condition, hence is not a true character friendship.   
The individual’s evaluative outlook must meet both the condition of “self-affirmability 
that is intersubjective, unreserved, and unconditional”93 and the condition of communal-
affirmability which I have created.  How, though, will the individual have access to such an 
abstract condition of affirmation?  The individual must take part in the larger endeavor of sorting 
thick evaluative concepts by taking part either directly or indirectly in subsidiary character 
friendships so that her primary “perfect character friendship” can approximate its ideal of 
universal self-affirmability.  By so taking part, the character friends’ evaluative outlooks will 
secure their objectivity by prevention of the unmooring which plagues the pre-synthetic 
formulation.  In this way my supplemented character friendship theory establishes the 
compossibility condition among members by limitation of their core outlook to one which is 
necessarily compossible.  Thus morality finds its place in the narrow phenomenological 
perspective illustrated above and in the broader perspective of individuals’ taking their part 
through character friendships in the highest dialectic of sculpting a community which is 
transcendently valuable.  
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VI. Conclusion 
 The synthesis of Retrieval and Finite is complete in the emendation of each by essential 
theories of each.  Retrieval’s theory dialectical activities fit nearly perfectly with the needs of 
Finite.  Alternately, reading Adams’s transcendent Good into the role of Brewer’s transcendental 
good was more of a squeeze.  The transcendent Good was first transformed into a transcendent 
community constituted by the dynamic interplay of subcommunities which unify the community 
in a network of character friendships.   The evaluative outlook of this community both connects 
with the practical perspective and is expressed in its thick evaluative concepts as they are 
socially sorted for better and worse ethical guidance.   A further connection was then made of the 
subjective place of the right in practical deliberation and the role the transcendent community 
might play in backing up morality.   
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